O\u27Shea v. High Mark Development Clerk\u27s Record v. 8 Dckt. 37869 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
3-21-2011
O'Shea v. High Mark Development Clerk's Record
v. 8 Dckt. 37869
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation





~P~la~in~t~iff~ _______________________ and 
--:.;;.::.:.;:==.:..-___________________ wId 
ppealellfrom the D trlel Court of the _~"-'-"e:.!.ln"'th"'--____________________ Jlldldal 
Di triel of the Stateo/ldD}Io In andfor _~B~o::.:.n:..:.n~t'V~il:.::1 '--_____________ _ unty 
• DiJrrlcl Jlld e 
• Timothy Hopkin 
P.O. Do 51219, Idaho aUs, ID 83405-1219 
Atrornq lor p~ant 
Richard J. rm tToog 
uth Temele. L T 8411 
Atrom~' lor R pondenr 
Filed tlri __ _ __~~~~~~-~~-------------~.20--. 
___________________ ~.~-------------------au. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE 
DONAHUE O'SHEA, Trustees of the 
Thomas and Anne O'Shea Trust u/dlt 
DATED NOVEMVER2, 1998; 
GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a 
California Limited Liability company; 
CALEB FOOTE, an individual, 
KATE LARKIN DONAHUE, an 
individual, JOHN KEVIN DONAHUE, 
an individual, and SAN FRANCISCO 




HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company; 
GORDON ARA VE, individually and as 
Member of High Mark Development, LLC; 
BENJAMIN ARA VE, individually and as 
Member of High Mark Development, 
LLC, and JOHN DOES I-X, 
DefendantlRespondents. 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE 
DONAHUE O'SHEA, Trustees of the 
Thomas and Anne O'Shea Trust u/dlt 
DATED NOVEMVER 2, 1998; 
GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a 
California Limited Liability company; 
CALEB FOOTE, an individual, 
KATE LARKIN DONAHUE, an 
individual, JOHN KEVIN DONAHUE, 
an individual, and SAN FRANCISCO 














































Case No. CV -2008-4025 
Docket No. 37869 
Volume 8 of9 
vs. ) 
) 
DALE A. SCHNEIDER, an individual; ) 
MAITHEW F. SMITH, an individual; THE ) 
CHILDREN'S CENTER, INC., an Idaho ) 
Corporation and THE IDAHO CHILDREN'S ) 




CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
************** 
Appeal from the District Court of the 
Seventh Judicial District of the State ofIdaho, 
in and for the County of Bonneville 
HONORABLE Joel E. Tingey, District Judge. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
C. Timothy Hopkins, Esq. 
HOPKINS, RODEN, CROCKETT, 
HANSEN & HOOPES 
Richard J. Armstrong 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411 P.O. Box 51219 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1219 
Attorney for Appellant Attorney for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Register of Actions (CV -08-2628), printed 9-20-1 0 ........................................................................ Vol.l-l 
Register of Actions (CV -08-4025), printed 8-13-1 0 ........................................................................ Vol.1-4 
Verified Complaint (CV -08-2628), filed 5-5-08 ............................................................................ Vol.1-21 
Defendant's Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint, filed 11-7-08 ......................................................... Vol.1-45 
Verified Complaint (CV-08-4025), filed 7-8-08 ............................................................................ Vol. 1-48 
Order Shortening Time to File and Hear Motion, filed 9-12-08 .................................................... Vol.1-81 
Minute Entry, dated 9-25-08 .......................................................................................................... Vol. 1-84 
Memorandum Decision and Order, filed 9-26-08 .......................................................................... Vol.1-87 
First Amended Verified Complaint, filed 10-1-08 ......................................................................... Vol. 1-93 
Answer to First Amended Verified complaint and Third Party Complaint, filed 10-21-08 ......... Vol.1-144 
Answer to Third Party Complaint, filed 11-7-08 ......................................................................... Vol.2-157 
Order for Telephonic Status Conference, filed 12-3-08 ............................................................... Vol.2-160 
Order Granting Motion for Limited Admission, filed 12-15-08 .................................................. Vol.2-163 
Order and Notice Setting Jury Trial, filed 12-15-08 .................................................................... Vol.2-166 
Order for Consolidation, filed 12-26-08 ....................................................................................... Vol.2-170 
Minute Entry, dated 1-14-09 ........................................................................................................ Vol.2-174 
Order, filed 1-16-09 ...................................................................................................................... Vol.2-178 
Minute Entry, dated 1-27-09 ........................................................................................................ Vol.2-182 
Minute Entry, dated 2-19-09 ........................................................................................................ Vol.2-186 
Order, filed 2-20-09 ...................................................................................................................... Vol.2-190 
Minute Entry, dated 5-5-09 .......................................................................................................... Vol.2-193 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Order, filed 5-20-09 ...................................................................................................................... Vol.2-197 
Order, filed 7-7-09 ........................................................................................................................ Vol.2-20 1 
Minute Entry, dated 7-8-09 .......................................................................................................... Vol.2-205 
Amended Order and Notice Setting Jury Trial, filed 7-8-09 ........................................................ Vol.2-209 
Order Granting Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, filed 11-13-09 ............................................. Vol.2-213 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed 11-13-09 ............................................................... Vol.2-217 
Brief in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed 11-13-09 ................................ Vol.2-221 
Statement of Facts in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed 11-13-09 .......... Vol.2-238 
Affidavit of Jeffrey L. Needs, filed 11-13-09 ............................................................................... Vol.2-260 
Affidavit of Marc J. Weinpel, filed 11-18-09 ............................................................................... Vol.2-273 
Affidavit of Sean J. Coletti, filed 11-13-09 
through Exhibit E ...................................................................................................................... Vol.2-280 
Affidavit of Sean J. Coletti, filed 11-13-09 
Exhibits F though K ................................................................................................................. Vol.4-455 
Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 11-27-09 ............................................ Vol.4-563 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, 
filed 11-27-1 0 .......................................................................................................................... Vo1.4-566 
Statement of Facts in Support of Defendants' Cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment, filed 11-27-09 ........................................................................................ Vol.4-593 
Affidavit of Richard J. Armstrong, filed 11-27-09 
through Exhibit S .................................................................................................................... Vol.5-626 
Affidavit of Richard J. Armstrong, filed 11-27-09 
Exhibits T through Exhibits RR ............................................................................................. Vol.6-81I 
Objection to Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary JudgmentlReply Brief in Support 
of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed 12-15-09 ..................................... Vol.7-994 
Second Affidavit of Sean J. Coletti, filed 12-15-09 ................................................................... Vol.7-1 018 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ii 
Statement of Facts in Opposition to Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment, dated 12-15-09 ..................................................................................................... Vol.7-1 073 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, filed 12-16-09 ...................................................................................................... Vol.7-1089 
Statement of Facts in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, filed 12-16-09 ...................................................................................................... Vol.7-1099 
Supplemental Affidavit of Richard J. Armstrong, filed 12-16-09 .............................................. Vol.7-1110 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Motions for Summary Judgment, filed 1-14-10 ............ Vol.7-1160 
Order Granting Ex Parte Request to Appear at the February 10, 2010 Motion 
Hearing by Telephone, filed 2-5-10 ...................................................................................... Vol.8-1181 
Minute Entry, dated 2-10-1 0 ...................................................................................................... Vol.8-1188 
Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instructions, filed 2-11-10 ................................................................. Vol.8-1192 
Defendant's Proposed Jury Instructions, filed 2-16-10 ........................................................... Vol.8-1261A 
Minute Entry, dated 2-16-1 0 ...................................................................................................... Vol.8-1262 
Order, filed 2-16-10 .................................................................................................................... Vol.8-1265 
Plaintiffs' first Supplement to Proposed Jury Instructions, filed 2-22-10 .................................. Vol.8-1267 
Objection to Defendants' Trial Brief and Proposed Jury Instructions, filed 2-22-10 ............. Vo1.8-1296A 
Defendants' Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instructions, filed 2-22-10 .................... Vol.8-1296M 
Defendants' Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions, filed 2-23-10 .................................... Vol.8-1296X 
Order, filed 2-24-10 .................................................................................................................... Vol.8-1297 
Minute Entry, dated 3-1-10 ........................................................................................................ Vol.8-1300 
Jury Instructions ...................................................................................................................... Vo1.8-1329A 
Verdict Form, 3-1 0-10 ................................................................................................................ Vol.8-1330 
Judgment Upon Verdict, filed 3-10-10 ....................................................................................... Vol.8-1333 
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or, Alternatively Motion for 
New Trial, filed 3-22-10 ........................................................................................................ Vol.9-1335 
TABLE OF CONTENTS iii 
Brief in Support of Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or, 
Alternatively, for New Trial, filed 3-22-1 0 ........................................................................... Vo1.9-1339 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict. Or, Alternatively, for New Trial, filed 5-11-10 ....................................................... VoI.9-1358 
Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, 
or, Alternatively, for New Trial, filed 5-14-10 ...................................................................... Vo1.9-1395 
Minute Entry, dated5-18-10 ....................................................................................................... Vo1.9-1408 
Decision and Order on Motion for JNOV or New Trial, filed 5-28-10 ...................................... Vo1.9-1412 
Minute Entry, dated 6-23-10 ...................................................................................................... Vo1.9-1423 
Order on Motion for costs and Attorney Fees, filed 7-2-10 ....................................................... Vo1.9-1425 
Judgment of Costs and Attorney Fees, filed 7-2-10 ................................................................... Vo1.9-1431 
Notice of Appeal, filed 7-8-10 ................................................................................................... V01.9-1433 
Clerk's Certificate of Appeal, filed 7-16-10 ............................................................................... Vo1.9-1441 
Clerk's Certificate of Appeal, dated 8-10-10 ............................................................................. Vo1.9-1444 
Order to Deposit Funds in an Interest Bearing Account, filed 8-31-10 ..................................... Vo1.9-1445 
Order Staying Execution and Releasing Judgment, Liens, filed 8-31-10 .................................. Vo1.9-1448 
Defendants' Request for Additional Record on Appeal, filed 9-1-10 ........................................ Vo1.9-1451 
Clerk's Certification of Exhibits, dated 9-23-10 ........................................................................ Vo1.9-1456 
Clerk's Certificate of Service, ................................................................................................... Vo1.9-147l 
TABLE OF CONTENTS iv 
INDEX 
Page 
Statement of Facts in Opposition to Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment, dated 12-15-09 ..................................................................................................... Vol.7-1073 
Affidavit of Jeffrey L. Needs, filed 11-13-09 ............................................................................... Vol.2-260 
Affidavit of Marc J. Weinpel, filed 11-18-09 ............................................................................... Vol.2-273 
Affidavit of Richard J. Armstrong, filed 11-27-09 
through Exhibit S .................................................................................................................... Vol.5-626 
Affidavit of Richard J. Armstrong, filed 11-27-09 
Exhibits T through Exhibits RR ............................................................................................. Vol.6-811 
Affidavit of Sean J. Coletti, filed 11-13-09 
through Exhibit E ...................................................................................................................... Vol.2-280 
Affidavit of Sean J. Coletti, filed 11-13-09 
Exhibits F though K ................................................................................................................. Vol.4-455 
Amended Order and Notice Setting Jury Trial, filed 7-8-09 ........................................................ Vol.2-209 
Answer to First Amended Verified complaint and Third Party Complaint, filed 10-21-08 ......... Vol.I-144 
Answer to Third Party Complaint, filed 11-7-08 ......................................................................... Vol.2-157 
Brief in Support of Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or, 
Alternatively, for New Trial, filed 3-22-10 ........................................................................... Vol.9-1339 
Brief in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed 11-13-09 ................................ Vo1.2-221 
Clerk's Certificate of Appeal, dated 8-10-10 ............................................................................. Vol.9-1444 
Clerk's Certificate of Appeal, filed 7-16-1 0 ............................................................................... Vol.9-1441 
Clerk's Certificate of Service, ................................................................................................... Vol.9-1471 
Clerk's Certification of Exhibits, dated 9-23-10 ........................................................................ Vol.9-1456 
Decision and Order on Motion for JNOV or New Trial, filed 5-28-10 ...................................... Vol.9-1412 
Defendant's Answer to Plaintiff s Complaint, filed 11-7-08 ......................................................... Vol.1-45 
INDEX v 
Defendant's Proposed Jury Instructions, filed 2-16-10 ........................................................... Vo1.8-1261A 
Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 11-27-09 ............................................ Vo1.4-563 
Defendants' Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instructions, filed 2-22-10 .................... Vo1.8-1296M 
Defendants' Request for Additional Record on Appeal, filed 9-1-10 ........................................ Vo1.9-1451 
Defendants' Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions, filed 2-23-10 .................................... Vo1.8-1296X 
First Amended Verified Complaint, filed 10-1-08 ......................................................................... Vol.1-93 
Judgment of Costs and Attorney Fees, filed 7-2-10 ................................................................... Vo1.9-1431 
Judgment Upon Verdict, filed 3-1 0-10 ....................................................................................... Vo1.8-1333 
Jury Instructions ...................................................................................................................... Vo1.8-1329A 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Motions for Summary Judgment, filed 1-14-10 ............ Vo1.7-1160 
Memorandum Decision and Order, filed 9-26-08 .......................................................................... Vol.1-87 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict. Or, Alternatively, for New Trial, filed 5-11-10 ....................................................... Vo1.9-1358 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, filed 12-16-09 ...................................................................................................... Vol. 7 -1089 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, 
filed 11-27-10 .......................................................................................................................... Vo1.4-566 
Minute Entry, dated 1-14-09 ........................................................................................................ Vo1.2-17 4 
Minute Entry, dated 1-27-09 ........................................................................................................ Vo1.2-182 
Minute Entry, dated 2-10-10 ...................................................................................................... Vo1.8-1188 
Minute Entry, dated 2-16-10 ...................................................................................................... Vo1.8-1262 
Minute Entry, dated 2-19-09 ........................................................................................................ Vo1.2-186 
Minute Entry, dated 3-1-1 0 ........................................................................................................ Vo1.8-1300 
Minute Entry, dated 6-23-1 0 ...................................................................................................... Vo1.9-1423 
INDEX vi 
Minute Entry, dated 7-8-09 .......................................................................................................... Vol.2-205 
Minute Entry, dated 9-25-08 .......................................................................................................... Vol. 1-84 
Minute Entry, dated 5-18-10 ...................................................................................................... Vol.9-1408 
Minute Entry, dated 5-5-09 .......................................................................................................... Vol.2-193 
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or, Alternatively Motion for 
New Trial, filed 3-22-1 0 ........................................................................................................ Vol.9-1335 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed 11-13-09 ............................................................... Vol.2-21 7 
Notice of Appeal, filed 7-8-10 ................................................................................................... Vol.9-1433 
Objection to Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary JudgmentlReply Brief in Support 
of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed 12-15-09 ..................................... Vol. 7 -994 
Objection to Defendants' Trial Brief and Proposed Jury Instructions, filed 2-22-10 ............. Vol.8-1296A 
Order and Notice Setting Jury Trial, filed 12-15-08 .................................................................... Vol.2-166 
Order for Consolidation, filed 12-26-08 ....................................................................................... Vo1.2-170 
Order for Telephonic Status Conference, filed 12-3-08 ............................................................... Vol.2-160 
Order Granting Ex Parte Request to Appear at the February 10,2010 Motion 
Hearing by Telephone, filed 2-5-1 0 ...................................................................................... Vol.8-1181 
Order Granting Motion for Limited Admission, filed 12-15-08 .................................................. Vol.2-163 
Order Granting Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, filed 11-13-09 ............................................. Vol.2-213 
Order on Motion for costs and Attorney Fees, filed 7-2-10 ....................................................... Vol.9-1425 
Order Shortening Time to File and Hear Motion, filed 9-12-08 .................................................... Vol.l-81 
Order Staying Execution and Releasing Judgment, Liens, filed 8-31-10 .................................. Vol.9-1448 
Order to Deposit Funds in an Interest Bearing Account, filed 8-31-10 ..................................... Vol.9-1445 
Order, filed 1-16-09 ...................................................................................................................... Vol.2-178 
Order, filed 2-16-10 .................................................................................................................... Vol.8-1265 
INDEX vii 
Order, filed 2-20-09 ...................................................................................................................... Vo1.2-190 
Order, filed 2-24-1 0 .................................................................................................................... Vol.8-1297 
Order, filed 5-20-09 ...................................................................................................................... Vo1.2-197 
Order, filed 7-7-09 ........................................................................................................................ Vol.2-201 
Plaintiffs' first Supplement to Proposed Jury Instructions, filed 2-22-10 .................................. Vo1.8-1267 
Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instructions, filed 2-11-10 ................................................................. Vo1.8-1192 
Register of Actions (CV -08-2628), printed 9-20-1 0 ........................................................................ Vo1.1-1 
Register of Actions (CV -08-4025), printed 8-13-10 ........................................................................ V01.1-4 
Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, 
or, Alternatively, for New Trial, filed 5-14-1 0 ...................................................................... VoI.9-1395 
Second Affidavit of Sean J. Coletti, filed 12-15-09 ................................................................... Vo1.7-1018 
Statement of Facts in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, filed 12-16-09 ...................................................................................................... VoI.7-1099 
Statement of Facts in Support of Defendants' Cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment, filed 11-27-09 ........................................................................................ Vo1.4-593 
Statement of Facts in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed 11-13-09 .......... Vo1.2-238 
Supplemental Affidavit of Richard J. Armstrong, filed 12-16-09 .............................................. Vo1.7-111 0 
Verdict Form, 3-10-1 0 ................................................................................................................ Vo1.8-1330 
Verified Complaint (CV -08-2628), filed 5-5-08 ............................................................................ Vol.1-21 
Verified Complaint (CV-08-4025), filed 7-8-08 ............................................................................ Vol. 1-48 
INDEX viii 
From:High ~ark O'Shea 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Richard J. Annstrong, ISBN 5548 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 366-6060 
Facsimile: (801) 366-6061 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
) 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE DONAHUE ) 
O'SHEA, Trustees of the Thomas and Anne ) 
O'Shea Trust uJdJt DATED NOVEMBER 2, ) 
1998; GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a ) 
California limited liability company; CALEB ) 
FOOT, an individual, KATE LARKIN ) 
DONAHUE, an individual, JOHN KEVIN ) 
DONAHUE, an individual, and SAN ) 
FRANCISCO RESIDENCE CLUB, INC., a ) 






HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company; GORDON ) 
ARA VE, individually and as Member of High ) 
Mark Development, LLC; JARED ARA VE, ) 
individually and as Member of High Mark ) 
Development, LLC; BENJAMIN D. ARA VE, ) 
individually and as Member of High Mark ) 





ORDER GRANTING EX PARTE 
REQUEST TO APPEAR AT THE 
FEBRUARY 10,2010 MOTION 
HEARING BY TELEPHONE 
Case No. CV -08-4025 
Judge Joel Tingey 
D 
- 4 2010 
- ------
From:High Mark O'Shea 801 366 6061 o 16:45 1437 P.00S/007 
) 
HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company; GORDON ) 
ARA VE, individually and as Member of High ) 
Mark Development, LLC; JARED ARA VE, ) 
individually and as Member of High Mark ) 
Development, LLC; BENJAMIN D. ARA VE, ) 
individually and as Member of High Mark ) 
Development, LLC, ) 
) 




THE CHILDREN'S CENTER, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation; THE IDAHO CHILDREN'S ) 
CENTER, INC., an Idaho corporation, ) 
) 
Third-Party Defendants. ) 
This matter is before the Court on Defendants I Ex Parte Request to Appear at the 
February 10, 2010 Motion Hearing by Telephone. Based on the motion, and there being no 
apparent cause for not granting said request, this Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' request to 
appear by telephone for the motion hearing currently scheduled for Tuesday, February 10,2010, 
at 9:15 a.m. 
DATED this ~ day of February, 2010. 
BY THE COURT 
1182 
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From:High Mark O'Shea 801 366 6061 021 10 16:45 1437 P.007/007 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 3rd day of February 2010, I served by email and U.S. 
mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' EX PARTE REQUEST TO APPEAR AT FEBRUARY 10,2010 MOTION 
HEARING BY TELEPHONE to the following: 
HOPKINS RODEN CROCKETT HANSEN & HOOPES, PLLC 
Gregory L. Crockett 
Sean J. Coletti 
428 Park Avenue 
P.O. Box 51219 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1219 
seancoletti@hopkinsroden.com 
gregcrockett@hopkinsroden.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Marc 1. Weinpel 
1975 Martha Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
mweinpel@familytc.us 
Attorney for Third-Party Defendants 
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WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Richard J. Annstrong, ISBN 5548 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 366-6060 
Facsimile: (801) 366-6061 
Attorneys for Defendants ' 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
STATE OF IDAlIO, COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
) 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE DONAHUE ) 
O'SHEA, Trustees ofthe Thomas and Anne ) 
O'Shea Trust uldlt DATED NOVEMBER 2, ) 
1998; GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a ) 
California limited liability company; CALEB ) 
FOOT, an individual, KATE LARKIN ) 
DONAHUE, an individual, JOHN KEVIN ) 
DONAHUE, an individual, and SAN ) 
FRANCISCO RESIDENCE CLUB, INC., a ) 






HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT, LLC~ an ) 
Idaho limited liability company; GORDON ) 
ARA VB, individually and as Member of High ) 
Mark Development, LLC; JARED ARA VE, ) 
individually and as Member of High Mark ) 
Development, LLC; BENJAMIN D. ARA VE, ) 
individually and as Member of High Mark ) 





ORDER GRANTING EX PARTE 
REQUEST TO APPEAR AT THE 
FEBRUARY 10, 2010 MOTION 
HEARING BY TELEPHONE 
Case No. CV -08-4025 
JudgeJoel Tingey 
~ IECCE HViE D 
FEB - ~ 2010 
---------------
From:High NarK O'Shea 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Richard 1. Annstrong, ISBN 5548 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 366-6060 
Facsimile: (801) 366-6061 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
) 
mOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE DONAHUE ) 
O'SHEA, Trustees of the Thomas and Anne ) 
O'Shea Trust u1d/t DATED NOVEMBER 2, ) 
1998; GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a ) 
California limited liability company; CALEB ) 
FOOT, an individual, KATE LARKIN ) 
DONAHUE, an individual, JOHN KEVIN ) 
DONAHUE, an individual, and SAN ) 
FRANCISCO RESIDENCE CLUB, INC., a ) 






HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company; GORDON ) 
ARA VE, individually and as Member of High ) 
Mark Development, LLC; JARED ARA VE, ) 
individually and as Member of High Mark ) 
Development, LLC; BENJAMIN D. ARA VE, ) 
individually and as Member of High Mark ) 





DEFENDANTS' EX PARTE 
REQUEST TO APPEAR AT THE 
FEBRUARY 10,2010 MOTION 
HEARING BY TELEPHONE 
Case No. CV -08-4025 
Judge Joel Tingey 
From:High Mark O'Shea 801 3BB BOB1 021 o 1B:45 1437 P.003/007 
) 
HIGH MARK. DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company; GORDON ) 
ARA VE, individually and as Member of High ) 
Mark Development, LLC; JARED ARA VE, ) 
individually and as Member of High Mark ) 
Development, LLC; BENJAMIN D. ARA VE, ) 
individually and as Member of High Mark ) 
Development, LLC, ) 
) 




THE CHILDREN'S CENTER, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation; THE IDAHO CHILDREN'S ) 
CENTER, INC., an Idaho corporation, ) 
) 
Third-Party Defendants. ) 
Pursuant to Idaho R. Civ. P. 7(b)(4), Defendants High Mark Development, LLC, 
Gordon Arave, Jared Arave, and Benjamin Arave, by and through the undersigned counsel of 
record, hereby respectfully move the Court, ex parte, for leave to appear by telephone at the 
February 10,2010 hearing on Plaintiffs' First Motion in Limine. The hearing is currently 
scheduled for Tuesday, February 10, 2010, at 9: 15 a.m. A proposed order accompanies this 
motion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of February, 2010. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
2 
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From:High Mark O'Shea 801 388 8081 021 o 18:45 #431 P.004/001 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 3rd day of February 2010, I served by email and U.S. 
mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' EX PARTE 
REQUEST TO APPEAR AT FEBRUARY 10,2010 MOTION HEARING BY TELEPHONE 
to the following: 
HOPKINS RODEN CROCKETT HANSEN & HOOPES, PLLC 
Gregory L. Crockett 
Sean 1. Coletti 
428 Park Avenue 
P.O. Box 51219 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1219 
seancoletti@hopkinsroden.com 
gregcrockett@hopkinsroden.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Marc J. Weinpel 
1975 Martha A venue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
mweinpel@farnilytc.us 
Attorney for Third-Party Defendants 
S\WPOATAII'I.EADlNG\IIlGK MARK.OSHEA.MonON TO APPI!Alt TElEPHONICAU. Y . ..,.s 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE DONOHUE ) 
O'SHEA, Trustees of the Thomas ) 
and Anne O'Shea Trust u/d/t ) 
DATED NOVEMBER 2, 1998i ) 
GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a ) 
California limited liability ) 
companYi CALEB FOOTE, an ) 
individuali KATE LARKIN DONOHUE,) 
an Individuali JOHN KEVIN ) 
DONOHUE, an Individuali and SAN ) 
FRANCISCO RESIDENCE CLUB, INC., ) 






HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company;) 
GORDON ARAVE, individually and ) 
as Member of High Mark ) 
Development, LLCi JARED ARAVE, ) 
individually and as Member of ) 
High Mark Development, LLCi ) 
BENJAMIN ARAVE, Individually and) 
as Member of High Mark ) 
Development, LLC, and ) 




HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability companYi) 
GORDON ARAVE, individually and ) 
as Member of High Mark ) 
Development, LLCi JARED ARAVE, ) 
individually and as Member of ) 
High Mark Development, LLC; ) 
BENJAMIN ARAVE/ Individually and) 
as Member of High Mark ) 
Development, LLC, and ) 
JOHN DOES I-X, ) 
) 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, ) 
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THE CHILDREN'S CENTER, INC., ) 
an Idaho corporation; THE IDAHO ) 
CHILDREN'S CENTER, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation, ) 
) 
Third Party Defendants. ) 
) 
=T=H-:::CO=M:-:;:-A-:::CS--::::O" -:::S:-;-:H;-;::E;-:;:A-a-n-d"'---:;A~N~N7.E:::;---:D;:::-O;:::CN~O-;:::-H;-;-U=E-) 
O'SHEA, Trustees of the Thomas ) 
and Anne O'Shea Trust u/d/t ) 
DATED NOVEMBER 2, 1998; ) 
GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a ) 
California limited liability ) 
company; CALEB FOOTE, an ) 
individual; KATE LARKIN DONOHUE,) 
an Individual; JOHN KEVIN ) 
DONOHUE, an Individual; and SAN ) 
FRANCISCO RESIDENCE CLUB, INC., ) 
a California corporation, ) 





THE CHILDREN'S CENTER, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation; THE IDAHO ) 
CHILDREN'S CENTER, INC.; an ) 
Idaho corporation; MATTHEW F. ) 
SMITH, individually and as ) 
Statutory Trustee; DALE A. ) 
SCHNEIDER, individually, and as ) 
Statutory Trustee; and JOHN ) 
DOES I-X, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
On the 10th day of February, 2010, Plaintiffs' motion in 
limine to exclude testimony of Robert Miller came before the 
Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, in open court at Idaho 
Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
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Mr. Sean Coletti appeared on behalf of the Plaintiffs. 
Mr. Richard Armstrong appeared by telephonic connection on 
behalf of Defendants High Mark Development, Gordon Arave, Ben 
Arave and Jared Arave. 
No one appeared on behalf of Defendant Dale Schneider. 
No one appeared on behalf of Defendants The Children's 
Center, Inc. and The Idaho Children's Center, Inc. 
Mr. Coletti presented Plaintiffs' moion in limine to exclude 
testimony of Robert Miller. Mr. Armstrong presented argument in 
opposition to the motion. Mr. Coletti presented rebuttal 
argument. Mr. Armstrong presented further argument. 
The Court denied the motion in limine at this time. Mr. 
Coletti will prepare a proposed order for the Court's signature. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of February, 2010,. I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to 
be delivered to the following: 
Gregory L. Crockett 
Sean J. Coletti 
PO Box 51219 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1219 
(Plaintiffs) 
Richard J. Armstrong 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 E. South Temple, Ste. 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Deputy Court Clerk 
(High Mark Development, Gordon Arave, Ben Arave and Jared Arave) 
Marc J. Weinpel 
1975 Martha Ave. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
(Children's Center, Inc. and The Idaho Children's Center, Inc) 
Kipp L. Manwaring 
381 Shoup Ave., Ste.210 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
(Dale Schneider) 
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HOPKINS RODEN CROCKETT 
HANSEN & HOOPES, PLLC 
Gregory L. Crockett, ISBN 1640 
Sean J. Coletti, ISBN 7199 
428 Park A venue 
P. O. Box 51219 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1219 
Telephone: 208-523-4445 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE 
DONAHUE O'SHEA, Trustees of the 
Thomas and Anne O'Shea Trust u/d/t 
DA TED NOVEMBER 2, 1998; 
GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a 
California limited liability company; 
CALEB FOOTE, an individual, 
KATE LARKIN DONAHUE, an 
individual, JOHN KEVIN 
DONAHUE, an individual, and SAN 
FRANCISCO RESIDENCE CLUB, 
INC., a California Corporation; 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company; GORDON ARA VE, 
individually and as Member of High 
Mark Development, LLC; JARED 
ARA VE, individually and as Member 
of High Mark Development, LLC; 
BENJAMIN ARA VE, individually 
and as Member of High Mark 
Development, LLC, and JOHN DOES 
I-X, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV -08-4025 
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS 
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PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - I 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys of record, the 
law firm of Hopkins Roden Crockett Hansen & Hoopes, PLLC, and, pursuant to the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 16, and the Amended Order and Notice Setting Jury 
Trial, submit and respectfully request the Court to adopt the attached Jury Instructions 
Nos. 1 through 36 and the Plaintiffs' Requested Verdict Fonn. 
DATED this 10th day of February, 2010. 
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PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY, 
FACSIMILE OR ELECTRONIC MAIL TRANSMISSION 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
on this date served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their 
name, either by mailing, hand delivery, telecopying or emailing to them a true and correct 
copy of said document in a properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid; by hand delivery to them; or by facsimile or email transmission. 
DATED this 10'h day of February, 2010. 
/,.,-",\ 
Richard J. Armstrong, Esq. 
Wood Crapo, LLC 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Email: lli!.nnstrong(d;wooll<:rapo.colll 
Marc Weinpel, Esq. 
1975 Martha Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Email: Illweinpel(fi;familytc.us 
/ ~/\\ 


















PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 3 
IDJI 1.24.2 
Given 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO.1 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is 
evidence that directly proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that 
indirectly pl'Oves the fact, by proving one or more facts from which the fact at 
issue may be inferred. 
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial 
evidence as to the degree of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable 
method of proof and each is respected for such convincing force as it may 
carry. 
Refused Modified Covered Other --- --- --- ---- ---
Given 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO.2 
In this case, Plaintiffs make the following claims against Defendant High 
Mark Development: 
1. Breach of Contract; 
2. Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 
3. Fraudulent Misrepresentation; 
4. Fraudulent Nondisclosure. 
Refused Modified Covered Other --- --- ----- --- ---
Given 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO.3 
In this case, Plaintiffs make the following claims against Defendant 
Gordon Arave: 
1. Fraudulent Misrepresentation; 
2. Fraudulent Nondisclosure. 
---
Refused Modified ---- --- Covered Other --- ---
PLAINTU'FS' INSTRUCTION NO.4 
In this case, Plaintiffs make the following claim against Defendants 
Benjamin Arave and Jared Arave: 
1. Fraudulent Nondisclosure. 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other ---- ----- ----- --- ---
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO.5 
In this case the Plaintiffs have also named as Defendants The Children's 
Center, Inc., The Idaho Children's Center, Inc., and Matthew F. Smith. 
Plaintiffs are not pursuing their claims against these Defendants in this trial. 
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Given Refused Modified' Covered Other ------ ----- ----- ------ ------
PLAINTIFFS' (AMENDED) INSTRUCTION NO.5 
Plaintiffs are not pursuing their claims against Defendants The 
Children's Center, Inc.; The Idaho Children's Center, Inc.; and Matthew F. 
Smith in this trial. Defendants The Children's Center, Inc. and The Idaho 
Children's Center, Inc. are now defunct, and Defendant Matthew F. Smith has 
been granted a discharge in bankruptcy. You are to disregard all claims or 
possible claims against these Defendants in reaching your decision. 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --- --- --- --- ---
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO.6 
The following representations contained in the October 17, 2007 Lease 
Estoppel Certificate (Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. __ ) were false: 
1. "The Lease is in full force and effect and has not been assigned, 
modified, supplemented, altered or amended in any respect (except as indicated 
following this sentence) and is the only lease or agreement between the 
undersigned and LandlOl'd affecting the premises." 
2. "Tenant is not aware of the existence of any condition which, 
with the giving of notice, the passage of time, or both, would constitute a default 
under the Lease on the part of the Tenant or Landlord." 
3. "All minimum monthly rent has been paid to the end of the 
current calendar month, which is September 2007." 
4. "The undersigned is not in default under the Lease and is 
current in the payment of any taxes, utilities, or other charges required to be 
paid by the undersigned." 
Memorandum Decision on Summary Judgment, p. 7-8. 
1.1.96 
Given Refused Modified ''vi Covered Other --- --- --- --- ---
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO.7 
As a matter of law in this case, the Plaintiffs had a contract with High 
Mark Development, LLC. The presentation of the false and misleading 
statements mentioned in Instruction No. was not in good faith and 
constituted both a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
and a breach of the contract by Defendant High Mark Development, LLC. 
Memorandum Decision on Summary Judgment, p. 9. 
11.97 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --- --- --- --- ---
lOll 6.10.1 - Breach of bilateral contract - general case - no affinnative defenses 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO.8 
Given 
To establish Breach of Contract, the Plaintiffs have the burden of 
proving each of the foUowing propositions: 
1. The Plaintiffs have been damaged on account of the breach by 
Defendant High Mark Development, LLC; and 
2. The amount of the damages. 
I f you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the 
propositions required of the Plaintiffs have been proved, then you must 
consider the issue of the affirmative defenses raised by the Defendants, and 
explained in instruction . If you find from your consideration of all the ---
evidence that any of the propositions in this instruction has not been proved, 
your verdict should be for the Defendants. 
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Refused Modified Covered .J Other --- ---- ----- ------
Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO.9 
In every contract, there is an implied obligation of good faith and 
dealing on the part of both parties. This covenant requires that the parties 
perform, in good faith, the obligations imposed by their contract. 
Comments: HALL v. FARMERS ALLIANCE MUT. INS. CO., 179 P.3d 276 (ID 2008) 
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Given Refused Modified Covered J Other --- --- --- ---
Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
To the extent a contract requires one party to provide information to 
the other party in anticipation of completing the contract, it is implicit in the 
contract that the information provided will be accurate and reliable. 
Memorandum Decision on Summary Judgment, p. 8-9. 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --- --- ---- ----
Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
To establish a Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing, the Plaintiffs have the burden of proving each of the foUowing 
propositions: 
1. The Plaintiffs have been damaged on account of the breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by Defendant High Mark 
Development, LLC; and 
2. The amount of the damages. 
If you find from your consideration of aU the evidence that each of the 
propositions required of the Plaintiffs have been proved, then you must 
consider the issue of the affirmative defenses raised by the Defendants, and 
explained in instruction ____ . If you fmd from your consideration of all 
the evidence that any of the propositions in this instruction has not been 
proved, your verdict should be for the Defendants. 
Comments: HALL v. FARMERS ALLIANCE MUT.INS. CO., 179 P.3d 276 (ID 2008) 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --- --- --- --- ---
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
Plaintiffs' Exhibits Nos. __ and __ , showing "Rent Received from 
6/2006 through 7/2007" for the Idaho Falls Children's Center, was provided to 
the Plaintiffs on behalf of Defendant High Mark Development, LLC. 
Memorandum Decision on Summary Judgment, p. 12. 
Given Refused Modified Covered --- Other ._-- ----
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
The following representation contained in the document showing "Rent 
Received from 6/2006 through 712007" for the Idaho Falls Children's Center 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibits Nos. __ ) was false: 
1. The statcmcnt showing rent received from June 2006 through 
July 2007 in the amount of $324,836.00. 
Memorandum Decision on Summary Judgment, p. 12. 
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Given Refused Modified Covered Other ---- --- --- --- -----
IDJI 4.60 - Fraud - issues 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 14 
To establish fraudulent misrepresentation, the Plaintiffs have the 
burden of proving each of the following propositions by clear and convincing 
evidence: 
J. That the Defendant stated a fact to the plaintiffs; 
2. The statement was false; 
3. The statement was material; 
4. The Defendant either knew the statement was false or was 
unaware of whether the statement was true at the time the statement was made. 
5. The Plaintiffs did not know that the statement was false; 
6. The Defendant intended for the Plaintiffs to rely upon the 
statement and act upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated; 
7. The Plaintiffs did rely upon the truth of the statement; 
8. The Plaintiffs' reliance was reasonable under all the 
circumstances; 
9. The Plaintiffs suffered damages proximately caused by reliance 
on the false statement. 
10. The nature and extent of the damages to the Plaintiffs, and the 
amount thereof. 
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence that the elements 
of fraud have been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict 
should be for the Plaintiffs on this issue. If you find from your consideration of 
Given ___ Refused ___ Modified __ _ Covered --- Other __ _ 
all the evidence that any of the foregoing propositions has not been proved by clear 
and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for the Defendant. 
Comment: 
A definition of materiality can be found in IDJI 6.08.5. 
See Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, P.2d 303 (2000); 
Watts v. Krebbs, 131 Idaho 616, 962 P.2d 387 (l998); Magic Lantern Prods. Inc. v. Dolsot, 126 
Idaho 805, 892 P.2d 480 (1995). 
See also, Witt v. Jones, III Idao 477,722 P.2d 474 (1986); Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 106 Idaho 
700,682 P.2d 1247 (1983); Faw v. Greenwood, 101 Idaho 387, 613 P.2d 1338 (1980); Smith v. 
King, 100 Idaho 331 597 P.2d 217 (1979); King v. McNeel, Inc., 94 Idaho 444,489 P.2d 1324. 
Given --- Refused Modified Covered ---- ---- ---
Other __ _ 
o 
Fraud by Nondisclosure - Duty to Speak 
Given 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
Fraud may also be established by silence where the Defendants or any 
one of them had a duty to speak. A duty to speak arises in situations where the 
parties do not deal on equal terms or where infonuation to be conveyed is not 
already in possession ofthe other party. A duty to speak may also arise in any 
one of the following instances: 
(a) disclosure would be necessary to prevent a partial or ambiguous 
statement of fact from becoming misleading; or 
(b) subsequent information has been acquired which a party knows 
will make a previous representation untrue or misleading; or 
(c) a party knows a false representation is about to be relied upon; 
or 
(d) a pal·ty knows the opposing party is about to enter into the 
transaction under a mistake of fact and because of the 
l·elationship between them or the customs of the trade or other 
objective circumstances would reasonably expect a disclosure of 
the facts. 
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Refused Modified Covered Other --- ----- ---- ----
Fraud by Nondisclosure Elements 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
To establish fraud by nondisclosure, the Plaintiffs have the burden of 
proving each of the following propositions by clear and convincing evidence: 
1. The Defendants, or anyone ofthem, had a duty to speak; 
2. There was nondisclosure; 
3. The Plaintiffs relied upon that nondisclosure; 
4. The Plaintiffs' reliance was material to the transaction; 
5. The Plaintiffs suffered damages proximately caused by reliance 
on the false statement. 
6. The nature and extent of the damages to the Plaintiffs, and the 
amount thereof. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the elements 
of fraud by nondisclosure have been proved by clear and convincing evidence, 
then your verdict should be for the Plaintiffs on this issue. If you find from 
your consideration of all the evidence that any of the foregoing propositions has 
not been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be 
for the Defendants. 
Comment: 
A definition of materiality can be found in IOJI 6.08.5. 
See Watts v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616, 962 P.2d 387 (1998). 
-""' Given Refused Modified Covered Other --- --- --- --- ---
Fraud 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
It is not a defense to fraud that the Plaintiffs could have, by independent 
investigation, ascertained the truth from other sources. 
See Sorenson v. Adams, 98 Idaho 708, 571 P.2d 769 (1977); Memorandum Decision on 
Summary Judgment, p. 15. 
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Given Refused --- Modified Covered Other --- ---- --- ---
Fraud 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 18 
If a seller engages in fraud, he will be liable unless the buyer actually 
examines sources of information used by the seller and draws his own 
independent conclusions. Conversely, if the buyer merely has an opportunity 
to examine such sources, but does not do so because he reasonably relies upon 
what the seller tells him, then he is entitled to relief from the seller's 
misrepresentation. 
See Sorenson v. Adams, 98 Idaho 708, 571 P.2d 769 (1977); Memorandum Decision on 
Summary Judgment, p. 15. 
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Given ___ Refused ____ Modified ___ Covered ____ Other __ _ 
Given 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 19 
As a matter of law, the October 17, 2007 Lease Estoppel Certificate 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit __ ) was made and provided to the Plaintiffs with the 
knowledge that it would be relied upon by the Plaintiffs in connection with the 
purchase of the property by the Plaintiffs. 
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Refused Modified Covered Other ----- ----- --- ----
IOJI 6.10.4 - General contract - affilmative defenses 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 20 
In this case the defendants High Mark Development, LLC, Gordon 
Arave, Jared Arave, and Benjamin D. Arave have asserted certain affirmative 
defenses. These defendants have the burden of proof on each of the affirmative 
defenses asserted. 
1. Failure to state a cause of action upon which relief can be 
granted. 
2. Failure to mitigate damages. 
3. Defendants did not breach the real estate purchase contract. 
4. If found liable to Plaintiffs, any recovery is subject to 




7. Unclean Hands. 
8. Failure to join necessary andlor indispensable parties. 
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the 
propositions required of the defendant has been proved, then your verdict 
should be for the defense. If you fmd from your consideration of all the 
evidence that any of the propositions has not been proved, then the defendant 
has not proved the affirmative defense in this case. 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --- --- --- --- ---
IDJI 6.40.1 - Agency defined 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 21 
The term "agent" refers to a person authorized by another, called the 
"principal," to act for or in the place of the principal. The principal is 
responsible for any act of the agent within the agent's scope of authority. 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --- --- --- --- ---
lDJI 6.40.2 - Agency - express 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 22 
The law recognizes agency relationships created by express authority. 
Agency by express authority exists when a person has been actually given 
authority by the principal to act in the principal's name for stated purposes. 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --- ---- ---- ---- ----
IDJI 6.40.3 - Agency - implied 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 23 
The law recognizes agency relationships created by implied authority. 
Agency by implied authority exists and applies to those acts by a person that 
are necessary, usual and proper to accomplish or perform within the express 
authority given by the principal. 
Given Refused ---
,/ ___ , Modified ____ Covered ___ Other __ _ 
IDJI 6.40.4 Agency - apparent 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 24 
The law recognizes agency relationships created by apparent authority. 
Agency by apparent authority exists when the principal voluntarily places a 
person in such a position that a third person, (conversant with the business 
usages and the nature of a particular business,) is justified in believing that the 
agent is authorized to act for the principal. 
Comments: 
Podol an v. Idaho Legal Aid, 123 Idaho 937; Clark v. Gneiting, 95 Idaho 10 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other ----- ---~-- --- ---
q D 
IDJI 6.40.5 - Agency defined 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 25 
An agency relationship exists where one, called the "principal," has 
authorized another, called the "agent," to act on behalf of the principal. 
Agency requires the consent of the principal, which consent may be 
expressed or implied. IA business purpose is not required.) [Compensation of 
the agent is not required.) (The term "'principal" includes employers, and the 
term "agent" includes employees.] 
Comments: 
Note: Use bracketed portions applicable to casco See, Thomton V. Budge, 257 P.2d 238, 
240, 74 Idaho 103 (Idaho 1953). 
Given v Refused Modified Covered Other --- ---- ----- ---- ----
IDJI 6.41.1 - Agent's act binds principal - agency admitted 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 26 
There is no dispute in this case that Richard J. Armstrong was the agent 
of principal High Mark Development, LLC, at the time of the transaction 
described by the evidence. Therefore, High Mark Development, LLC, the 
principal, is responsible for any act of Richard J. Armstrong, the agent, within 
the scope of the agent's authority. 
1""' 0 hl 
Given --- Refused Modified Covered Other --- --- --- ---
IDJ I 6.41.1 - Agent's act binds principal - agency admitted 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 27 
There is no dispute in this case that Scott Williams was the agent of 
principal High Mark Development, LLC, at the time of the transaction 
described by the evidence. Therefore, High Mark Development, LLC, the 
principal, is responsible for any act of Scott Williams, the agent, within the 
scope of the agent's authority. 
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Given Refused Modified Covered Other --- ----- --- ----
lOll 6.41.1 - Agent's act binds principal - agency admitted 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 28 
There is no dispute in this case that Paul Fife was the agent of principal 
High Mark Development, LLC, at the time of the transaction described by the 
evidence. Therefore, High Mark Development, LLC, the principal, is 
responsible for any act of Paul Fife, the agent, within the scope of the agent's 
authority. 
1° 1 ,) t- . $..., 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --- --- -,--- --- ---
IDJ I 6.41.1 - Agent's act binds principal - agency admitted 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 29 
Given 
There is no dispute in this case that Richard J. Armstrong was the agent 
of principal Gordon Arave, at the time of the transaction described by the 
evidence. Therefore, Gordon Arave, the principal, is responsible for any act of 
Richard J. Armstrong, the agent, within the scope of the agent's authority. 
1213 
Refused Modified Covered Other ---- --- --- ---
IDJ I 6.41.2 - Liability of principal and agent 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 30 
Both agent and principal are liable for acts by the agent, acting within 
the scope of authority for the principal, unless the identity of the principal and 
nature of the agency are known to the plaintiff at or before the time of the act 
in question. Where the identity of the principal and nature of the agency were 
known, only the principal is liable. 
Given --- Refused Modified Covered ------ ---- Other ---- -----
IDJI 6.43.1 - Scope of authority 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 31 
Conduct is within the scope of the agent's authority if it occurs while the 
agent is engaged in the duties that the agent was asked or expected to perform 
and relates to those duties. It is not necessary that a particular act or failure to 
act be expressly authorized by the principal to bring it within the scope of the 
agent's authority. Conduct for the benefit of the principal that is incidental to, 
customarily connected with, or reasonably necessary for the performance of 
such duties is within the scope of the agent's authority. 
Comment: 
See, Landvik v. Herbert, 936 P.2d 697, 702, 130 Idaho 54 (Idaho App. 1997). (The Court 
of Appeals noted that agency by apparent authority has not been extended to tort law in Idaho, 
but declined to address the issue further because the case was decided on other grounds). 
Given Refused Modified --- ---- Covered Other -- ---- ----
Given 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 32 
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use 
the expression" if you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded 
that the proposition is more probably true than not true. 
1215 
Refused Modified Covered Other --- --- ---- --- -------
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 33 
Whether a party has insurance is not relevant to any of the questions 
you are to decide. You must avoid any infe.-ence, speculation or discussion 
about insurance. 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other ---- ---- ------ --- ---
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRlJCTION NO. 34 
When I use thc cxp.·cssion "proximatc causc," I mcan a causc which, in 
natural or probablc sequence, produccd the complained injury, loss or damage, 
and but for that causc the damage would not have occurred. It necd not be the 
only causc. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the 
injury, loss or damage. It is not a proximate causc if the injury, loss or damage 
likely would have occurred anyway. 
Given .. / Refused Modified Covered Other "---- --- ---- ----
IDJl9.03 - Damages 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 35 
If the jury decides the plaintiffs are entitled to recover from the 
defendants, the jury must determine the amount of money that will reasonable 
and fairly compensate the plaintiffs for any of the following elements of 
damages proved by the evidence to have resulted from the defendant's breach 
of contract and misrepresentations: 
1. Lost Profits. Plaintiffs claim lost profits in the amount of 
$801,594.00, including 12% interest on past damages as a result of 
the alleged misrepresentations of the defendant(s). 
2. Loss of Value. Plaintiffs claim a loss of projected value in their 
investment in the amount of $1,363,648.00, including interest at 12% 
on past damages as a result of the alleged misrepresentations of the 
defendant(s). 
3. Rescission Damages. Plaintiffs claim rescission damages of 
$1,813,141.00, including interest of 12% on past damages to 
purchase the property, maintain the property, and locate a new 
tenant. This amount would be the amount claimed necessary to 
rescind the purchase, reimburse the expenses incurred by the 
Plaintiff(s), and make the Plaintiff(s) whole as though the 
transaction had never occurred. 
Whether any of these elements of damage has been proved is for you to 
determine. 1217 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other ---- --- ------ ------- ------
lOll 6.43.2 - Rescission 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 36 
As a portion of their damages, Plaintiffs have asked for rescission of the 
purchase. Rescission is an equitable remedy which ideally brings the parties to 
their pre-contract status quo. It abrogates the contract and restores parties to 
their original position, as if the contract had never occurred. A party seeking 
to rescind a transaction on the ground of fraud must restore or offer to restore 
the other party to the status quo before the contract was formed. The party 
seeking rescission must act promptly once the grounds for rescission arise. If 
you find tbat the Defendant(s) are liable in this case, and that the Plaintiffs 
acted promptly once grounds for rescission arose to offer to restore the 
Defendants to their pre-contract position, you may grant the Plaintiffs 
rescission damages. 
Comments: 
O'Connor v. Harger Const.. Inc., 188 P.3d 846,851 (Idaho 2008); Watson v. Weick, 141 
Idaho 500,507, 112 P.3d 788 (2005); White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 888 104 P.3d 356 (2004). 
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Given Refused Modified Covered Other --- --- ------ ---. 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED VERDICT FORM 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT Of THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE 
DONAHUE O'SHEA, Trustees of the 
Thomas and Anne O'Shea Trust u/d/t 
DATED NOVEMBER 2, 1998; 
GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a 
California limited liability company; 
CALEB FOOTE, an individual, KATE 
LARKIN DONAHUE, an individual, 
JOHN KEVIN DONAHUE, an 
individual, and SAN FRANCISCO 




HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company; 
GORDON ARAVE, individually and as 
Member of High Mark Development, 
LLC; JARED ARAVE, individually and 
as Member of High Mark Development, 
LLC; BENJAMIN ARA VE, individually 
and as Member of High Mark 
Development, LLC, and JOHN DOES I-
X, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV -08-4025 
VERDICT 
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows: 
121 ~) 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --- ---- ----- ---- ----
Question No.1: Was Defendant High Mark Development, LLC's breach of the Purchase 
and Sale Agreement a proximate cause of the Plaintiffs' damages? 
Answer to Question No.1: No [_] Yes [ __ ] 
If you answered "No" to Question No.1, skip to Question 3. If you answered "Yes" to 
Question No.1, proceed to Question No.2. 
Question No.2: Was Defendant High Mark Development, LLC's breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing a proximate cause of the Plaintiffs' damages? 
Answer to Question No.2: No [_] Yes L_J 
Question No.3: Did Defendant High Mark Development, LLC commit fraudulent 
misrepresentation? 
Answer to Question No.3: No [_] 
If you answered "No" to Question No.3, skip to Question 5. If you answered "Yes" to 
Question No.3, proceed to Question No.4. 
Question No.4: Were Defendant High Mark Development, LLC's actions in Question 
No.3 a proximate cause of Plaintiffs' damages? 
Answer to Question No.4: No [ __ ] Yes [_] 
Question No.5: Did Defendant High Mark Development, LLC commit fraudulent 
nondisclosure? 
Answer to Question No.5: No[_] Yes [ ] 
If you answered "No" to Question No.5, skip to Question 7. If you answered "Yes" to 
Question No.5, proceed to Question No.6. 
Question No.6: Were Defendant High Mark Development's actions in Question No.5 a 
proximate cause of Plain tift'S' damages? 
1 2"~ 0 .1. ... t.. 
Given ___ Refused ___ Modified ___ Covered ___ Other __ _ 
Question No.7: Did Defendant Gordon Arave commit fraudulent misrepresentation? 
Answer to Question No.7: No[_] Yes [_] 
If you answered "No" to Question No.7, skip to Question 9. If you answered "Yes" to 
Question No.7, proceed to Question No.8. 
Question No.8: Were Defendant Gordon Arave's actions in Question No.7 a proximate 
cause of Plaintiffs' damages? 
Answer to Question No.8: No[_] Yes [_] 
Question No.9: Did Defendant Gordon Arave commit fraudulent nondisclosure? 
Answer to Question No.9: No[_J Yes[~ 
If you answered "No" to Question No.9, skip to Question It. If you answered "Yes" to 
Question No.9, proceed to Question No. 10. 
Question No. 10: Were Defendant Gordon Arave's actions 111 Question No. 9 a 
proximate cause of Plaintiffs' damages? 
Answer to Question No. 10: No [_] Yes [_] 
Question No. 11: Did Defendant Benjamin Arave commit fraudulent nondisclosure? 
Answer to Question No. 11: No [ ] Yes [_] 
If you answered "No" to Question No. 11, skip to Question 13. If you answered "Yes" to 
Question No. II, proceed to Question No. 12. 
Question No. 12: Were Defendant Benjamin Arave's actions 111 Question No. 11 a 
proximate cause of Plaintiffs' damages? 
Answer to Question No. 12: No L_] Yes [_] 
Question No. 13: Did Defendant Jared Arave commit fraudulent nondisclosure? 
Answer to Question No. 13: No [_] Yes [_] 
1221 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --- --- --- --- ---
If you answered "No" to Question No. 13, skip to Question 15. If you answered "Yes" to 
Question No. 13, proceed to Question No. 14. 
Question No. 14: Were Defendant Jared Arave's actions in Question No. 13 a proximate 
cause of Plaintiffs' damages? 
Answer to Question No. 14: No [_] Yes [---.J 
If you answered "No" to all of the above questions, then you are done. Sign the verdict 
and advise the bailiff. If you answered "Yes" to any or all of Questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6, 
proceed to Question No. 15. 
Question No. 15: What is the total amount of damage sustained by the Plaintiffs as a 
result of the claims against High Mark Development, LLC? 
Answer to Question No. 15: We assess Plaintiffs' damages as follows: 
If you answered "No" to Questions 7, 8, 9 and 10, then you are done. Sign the verdict 
and advise the bailiff. If you answered "Yes" to any or all of Questions 7, 8,9, or 10, proceed to 
Question No. 16. 
Question No. 16: What is the total amount of damage sustained by Plaintiffs as a result 
of the claims against Gordon Arave? 
Answer to Question No. 16: We assess Plaintiffs' damages as follows: 
If you answered "No" to Questions 11 and 12, then you are done. Sign the verdict and 
advise the bailiff. If you answered "Yes" to Questions 11 and 12, proceed to Question No. 17 . 
Given Refused 
. 100", 
ModIfied·!. "". I... "'- Covered Other ---- ---- ------ ------
Question No. 17: What is the total amount of damage sustained by Plaintiffs as a result 
of the claims against Benjamin Arave? 
Answer to Question No. 17: We assess Plaintiffs' damages as follows: 
If you answered "No" to Questions 13 and 14, then you are done. Sign the verdict and 
advise the bailiff If you answered "Yes" to Questions 13 and 14, proceed to Question No. 18. 
Question No. 18: What is the total amount of damage sustained by Plaintiffs as a result 
of the claims against Jared Arave? 
AI1swer to Question No. 18: We assess Plaintiffs' damages as follows: 
DATED THIS __ day of ________ , 2010. 
Foreperson 
If not unanimous, individual jurors should sign: 
---------------
1223 
Given --- Refused ___ Modified ___ Covered ____ Other __ _ 
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INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is 
evidence that directly proves a fact. Circumstantial e\idence is evidence that 
indirectly proves the fact, by proving one or more facts from which the fact at 
issue may be inferred. 
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial 
evidence as to the degree of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable 




In this case, Plaintiffs make the following claims against Defendant High 
Mark Development: 
1. Breach of Contract; 
2. Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 
3. Fraudulent Misrepresentation; 
4. Fraudulent Nondisclosure. 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
In this case, Plaintiffs make the following claims against Defendant 
Gordon Arave: 
1. Fraudulent Misrepresentation; 
2. Fraudulent Nondisclosure. 
1227 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
In this case, Plaintiffs make the following claim against Defendants 
Benjamin Arave and Jared Arave: 
1. Fraudulent Nondisclosure. 
1228 
INSTRUCTION NO. ---
To establish "fraudulent misrepresentation, the Plaintiffs have the 
burden of proving each of the following propositions by clear and convincing 
evidence: 
1. That the Defendant stated a fact to the plaintiffs; 
2. The statement was false; 
3. The statement was material; 
4. The Defendant either knew the statement was false or was 
unaware of whether the statement was true at the time the statement was made. 
5. The Plaintiffs did not know that the statement was false; 
6. The Defendant intended for the Plaintiffs to rely upon the 
statement and act upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated; 
7. The Plaintiffs did rely upon the truth of the statement; 
8. The Plaintiffs' reliance was reasonable under all the 
circumstances; 
9. The Plaintiffs suffered damages proximately caused by reliance 
on the false statement. 
10. The nature and extent of the damages to the Plaintiffs, and the 
amount thereof. 
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence that the elements 
of fraud have been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict 
should be for the Plaintiffs on this issue. If you find from your consideration of 
all the evidence that any of the fOl"egoing propositions has not been proved by 
clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for the Defendant. 
1o r.: (l s..v '-' .. 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
The term "agent" refers to a person authorized by another, called the 
"principal," to act for or in the place of the principal. The principal is 
responsible for any act of the agent within the agent's scope of authority. 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
The law recognizes agency relationships created by express authority. 
Agency by express authority exists when a person has been actually given 
authority by the principal to act in the principal's name for stated purposes. 
10'12 . '- '-
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
The law recognizes agency relationships created by implied authority. 
Agency by implied authority exists and applies to those acts by a person that 
are necessary, usual and proper to accomplish or perform within the express 
authority given by the principal. 
1233 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
The law recognizes agency relationships created by apparent authority. 
Agency by apparent authority exists when the principal voluntarily places a 
person in such a position that a third person, [conversant with the business 
usages and the nature of a particular business,) is justified in believing that the 
agent is authorized to act for the principal. 
10 rJ il 
~"L ~ .... '-- ..... 
INSTRUCTION NO. ---
An agency relationship exists where one, called the "principal," has 
authorized another, called the "agent," to act on behalf of the principal. 
Agency requires the consent of the principal, which consent may be 
expressed or implied. IA business purpose is not required.) [Compensation of 
the agent is not required.] [The term "principal" includes employers, and the 
term "agent" includes employees.] 
1235 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
Both agent and principal are liable for acts by the agent, acting within 
the scope of authority for the principal, unless the identity of the principal and 
nature of the agency are known to the plaintiff at or before the time of the act 
in question. \Vhere the identity of the principal and nature of the agency were 
known, only the principal is liable. 
10'')6 . t-. ... i ... 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
Conduct is within the scope of the agent's authority if it occurs while the 
agent is engaged in the duties that the agent was asked or expected to perform 
and relates to those duties. It is not necessary that a particular act or failure to 
act be expressly authorized by the principal to bring it within the scope of the 
agent's authority. Conduct for the benefit of the principal that is incidental to, 
customarily connected with, or reasonably necessary for the performance of 
such duties is within the scope of the agent's authority. 
1~!37 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause which, in 
natural or probable sequence, produced the complained injury, loss or damage, 
and but for that cause the damage would not have occurred. It need not be the 
only cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the 
injury, loss or damage. It is not a proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage 
likely would have occurred anyway. 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
In this case tht! Plaintiffs have also named as Defendants The Children's 
Center, Inc., The Idaho Children's Center, Inc., and Matthew F. Smith. 
Plaintiffs are not pursuing their claims against these Defendants in this trial. 
122Q 
INSTRUCTION NO. ---
The foUowing representations contained in the October 17, 2007 Lease 
Estoppel Certificate (Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. ~ were false: 
1. "The Lease is in fuU force and effect and has not been assigned, 
modified, supplemented, altered or amended in any respect (except as indicated 
following this sentence) and is the only lease or agreement between the 
undersigned and Landlord affecting the premises." 
2. "Tenant is not aware of the existence of any condition which, 
with the giving of notice, the passage of time, or both, would constitute a default 
under the Lease on the part of the Tenant or Landlord." 
3. "All minimum monthly rent has been paid to the end of the 
current calendar month, which is September 2007." 
4. "The undersigned is not in default under the Lease and is 
current in the payment of any taxes, utilities, or other charges required to be 
paid by the undersigned." 
INSTRUCTION NO. ---
As a matter of law in this case, the Plaintiffs had a contract with High 
Mark Development, LLC. The presentation of the false and misleading 
statements mentioned in Instruction No. was not in good faith and 
constituted both a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
and a breach of the contract by Defendant High Mark Development, LLC. 
1241 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
To establish Breach of Contract, the Plaintiffs have the burden of 
proving each of the following propositions: 
1. The Plaintiffs have been damaged on account of the breach by 
Defendant High Mark Development, LLC; and 
2. The amount of the damages. 
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the 
propositions required of the Plaintiffs have been proved, then you must 
consider the issue of the affirmative defenses raised by the Defendants, and 
explained in instruction ___ . If you find from your consideration of all the 
evidence that any of the propositions in this instruction has not been proved, 
your verdict should be for the Defendants. 
1~~42 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
In every contract, there is an implied obligation of good faith and 
dealing on the part of both parties. This covenant requires that the parties 
perform, in good faith, the obligations imposed by their contract. 
1243 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
To the extent a contract requires one party to provide information to 
the other party in anticipation of completing the contract, it is implicit in the 
contract that the information provided will be accurate and reliable. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ---
To establish a Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing, the Plaintiffs have the burden of proving each of the following 
propositions: 
1. The Plaintiffs have been damaged on account of the breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by Defendant High Mark 
Development, LLC; and 
2. The amount of the damages. 
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the 
propositions required of the Plaintiffs have been proved, then you must 
consider the issue of the affirmative defenses raised by the Defendants, and 
explained in Instruction No. ___ . If you fmd from your consideration of all 
the evidence that any of the PI'opositions in this instruction has not been 
proved, your verdict should be for the Defendants. 
1 r)4r.:::) ..:1........ , 
INSTRUCTION NO. ---
Plaintiffs' Exhibits Nos. __ and __ , showing "Rent Received from 
6/2006 through 7/2007" for the Idaho Falls Children's Center, was provided to 
the Plaintiffs on behalf of Defendant High Mark Development, LLC. 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
The following representation contained in the document showing "Rent 
Received from 6/2006 through 7/2007" for the Idaho Falls Children's Center 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibits Nos. ~ was false: 
1. The statement showing rent received from June 2006 through 
July 2007 in the amount of $324,836.00. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
Fraud may also be established by silence where the Defendants or any 
one of them had a duty to speak. A duty to speak arises in situations where the 
parties do not deal on equal terms or where information to be conveyed is not 
already in possession of the other party. A duty to speak may also arise in any 
one of the following instances: 
(a) disclosure would be necessary to prevent a partial or ambiguous 
statement of fact from becoming misleading; or 
(b) subsequent information has been acquired which a party knows 
will make a previous representation untrue or misleading; or 
(c) a party knows a false representation is about to be relied upon; 
or 
(d) a party knows the opposing party is about to enter into the 
transaction under a mistake of fact and because of the 
relationship between them or the customs of the trade or other 
objective circumstances would reasonably expect a disclosure of 
the facts. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ---
To establish fraud by nondisclosure, the Plaintiffs have the burden of 
proving each of the foUowing propositions by clear and convincing evidence: 
1. The Defendants, or anyone of them, had a duty to speak; 
2. There was nondisclosure; 
3. The Plaintiffs relied upon that nondisclosure; 
4. The Plaintiffs' reliance was material to the transaction; 
5. The Plaintiffs suffered damages proximately caused by reliance 
on the false statement. 
6. The nature and extent of the damages to the Plaintiffs, and the 
amount thereof. 
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence that the elements 
of fraud by nondisclosure have been proved by clear and convincing evidence, 
then your verdict should be for the Plaintiffs on this issue. If you find from 
your consideration of all the evidence that any of the foregoing propositions has 
not been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be 
for the Defendants. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ---
It is not a defense to fraud that the Plaintiffs could have, by independent 
investigation, ascertained the truth from other sources. 
1250 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
If a seller engages in fraud, he will be liable unless the buyer actually 
examines sources of information used by the seller and draws his own 
independent conclusions. Conversely, if the buyer merely has an opportunity 
to examine such sources, but does not do so because he reasonably relies upon 
what the seller tells him, then he is entitled to relief from the seller's 
misrepresentation. 
1251 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
As a matter of law, the October 17, 2007 Lease Estoppel Certificate 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit ---> was made and provided to the Plaintiffs with the 
knowledge that it would be relied upon by the Plaintiffs in connection with the 
purchase of the property by the Plaintiffs. 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
In this case the defendants High Mark Development, LLC, Gordon 
Arave, Jared Arave, and Benjamin D. Arave have asserted certain affirmative 
defenses. These defendants have the burden of proof on each of the affirmative 
defenses asserted. 
1. Failure to state a cause of action upon which relief can be 
granted. 
2. Failure to mitigate damages. 
3. Defendants did not breach the real estate purchase contract. 
4. If found liable to Plaintiffs, any recovery is subject to 




7. Unclean Hands. 
8. Failure to join necessary and/or indispensable parties. 
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the 
propositions required of the defendant has been proved, then your verdict 
should be for the defense. If you fmd from your consideration of all the 
evidence that any of the propositions has not been proved, then the defendant 
has not proved the affirmative defense in this case. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ---
There is no dispute in this case that Richard J. Armstrong was the agent 
of principal High Mark Development, LLC, at the time of the transaction 
described by the evidence. Therefore, High Mark Development, LLC, the 
principal, is responsible for any act of Richard .J. Armstrong, the agent, within 
the scope of the agent's authority. 
1254 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
There is no dispute in this case that Scott Williams was the agent of 
principal High Mark Development, LLC, at the time of the transaction 
described by the evidence. Therefore, High Mark Development, LLC, the 
principal, is responsible for any act of Scott Williams, the agent, within the 
scope of the agent's authority. 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
There is no dispute in this case that Paul Fife was the agent of principal 
High Mark Development,LLC, at the time of the transaction described by the 
evidence. Therefore, High Mark Development, LLC, the principal, is 




There is no dispute in this case that Richard J. Armstrong was the agent 
of principal Gordon Arave, at the time of the transaction described by the 
evidence. Therefore, Gordon Arave, the principal, is responsible for any act of 
Richard J. Armstrong, the agent, within the scope of the agent's authority. 
1257 
INSTRUCTION NO. ---
'Vhen I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use 
the expression "if you fmd" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded 
that the proposition is more probably true than not true. 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
Whether a party has insurance is not relevant to any of the questions 
you are to decide. You must avoid any inference, speculation or discussion 
about insurance. 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
If the jury decides the plaintiffs are entitled to recover from the 
defendants, the jury must determine the amount of money that will reasonable 
and fairly compensate the plaintiffs for any of the following elements of 
damages proved by the evidence to have resulted from the defendant's breach 
of contract and misrepresentations: 
1. Lost Profits. Plaintiffs claim lost profits in the amount of 
$801,594.00, including 12% interest on past damages as a result of 
the alleged misrepresentations of the defendant(s). 
2. Loss of Value. Plaintiffs claim a loss of projected value in their 
investment in the amount of $1,363,648.00, including interest at 12% 
on past damages as a result of the alleged misrepresentations of the 
defendant(s). 
3. Rescission Damages. Plaintiffs claim rescission damages of 
$1,813,141.00, including interest of 12% on past damages to 
purchase the property, maintain the property, and locate a new 
tenant. This amount would be the amount claimed necessary to 
rescind the purchase, reimburse the expenses incurred by the 
Plaintiff(s), and make the Plaintiff(s) whole as though the 
transaction had never occurred. 
Whether any of these elements of damage has been proved is for you to 
determine. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
As a portion of their damages, Plaintiffs have asked for rescission of the 
purchase. Rescission is an equitable remedy which ideally brings the parties to 
their pre-contract status quo. It abrogates the contract and restores parties to 
their original position, as if the contract had never occurred. A party seeking 
to rescind a transaction on the ground of fraud must restore or offer to restore 
the other party to the status quo before the contract was formed. The party 
seeking rescission must act promptly once the grounds for rescission arise. If 
you find that the Defendant(s) are liable in this case, and that the Plaintiffs 
acted promptly once grounds for rescission arose to offer to restore the 
Defendants to their pre-contract position, you may grant the Plaintiffs 
rescission damages. 
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WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Richard J. Armstrong, ISBN 5548 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 366-6060 
Facsimile: (801) 366-6061 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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Case No. CV-08-4025 
Judge Tingey 
Pursuant to Idaho R. Civ. P. SI(a) and paragraph 11.4 of the Court's Amended 
Order and Notice Setting Jury Trial, Defendants High Mark Development, LLC, Gordon Arave, 
Benjamin D. Arave, and Jared Arave, by and through their counsel of record, hereby submit their 
requested jury instructions, excluding applicable IDJI2 instruction numbers 1.01 through 1.43: 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No.5 
Corporations Act Through Their Agents: 
Acts of Corporate Agents are those of the Corporation, Not the Individuals 
High Mark Development, LLC is a limited liability company, and, as such can act only through 
its officers and employees, and others designated by it as their agents. Any act or omission of an 
officer, employee, or agent of a limited liability company, in the performance of the duties or 
within the scope of the authority of the officer, employee, or agent, is the act or omission ofthe 
limited liability company, and not the individual. The only time an officer of a company can be 
held personally responsible for the actions of the company is in those situations where the 
plaintiffs can prove by clear and convincing evidence that the individual officer specifically 
directed, actively participated in, or knowingly acquiesced in the fraud alleged by plaintiffs. 
VFP VC v. Dakota Co., 109 P.3d 714, 722 (Idaho 2005); Idaho Code §§ 53-619,53-620; 






Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No.6 
Agency defined 
The term "agent" refers to a person authorized by another, called the "principal," to act for or in 
the place of the principal. The principal is responsible for any act of the agent within the agent's 







I ~ltl D 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No.7 
Agency - Express 
The law recognizes agency relationships created by express authority. Agency by express 
authority exists when a person has been actually given authority by the principal to act in the 







Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No.8 
Real Estate Broker's/Agent's Duties to Client 
A real estate agent owes several duties and obligations to those they represent in a real estate 
transaction. These legal duties and obligations include the duty to disclose to his or her client all 
adverse material facts actually known or which reasonably should have been known by the real 
estate agent. A real estate agent's failure to disclose material facts actually known or which 
reasonably should have been known by the real estate agent is a relevant factor you may consider 
in determining whether a party has justifiably relied on misrepresentations of fact or a failure to 
disclose. 






Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. 11 
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendant High Mark breached a covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, and Defendant High Mark has claimed as one of its defenses in this case that Plaintiffs 
themselves breached a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing is implied in every contract. The covenant requires that the parties perform in good 
faith the obligations imposed by their agreement, and a violation of the covenant occurs only 
when either party violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the contract. 
Idaho First Nat'/ Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266, 288,824 P.2d 841, 863 (1991); 






Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. 12 
Affirmative Defenses 
In this case Defendant High Mark has asserted certain affirmative defenses. Defendant High 
Mark has the burden of proof on each of the affirmative defenses asserted. 
1. Estoppel by Breach: Plaintiffs may not rely on a breach of contract 
resulting from a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
because Plaintiffs first breached the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, thus excusing the later breach by Defendant High Mark. See 
Instruction No. 
2. Failure to Mitigate and Avoid: Plaintiffs failed to mitigate or avoid the 
complained of damages and therefore cannot recover for their own since 
the damages were caused by or made worse by their own action or 
inaction. See Instruction No. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the propositions required for 
any of Defendant High Mark's affirmative defenses has been proved, then your verdict should be 
for defendants. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any ofthe 
propositions of an affirmative defense has not been proved, then Defendant High Mark has not 







Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. 13 
Estoppel by Breach 
Defendant High Mark has raised the defense of estoppel by breach. This legal term means that 
Plaintiffs may not rely on a breach of contract resulting from a breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing if Plaintiffs first breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. To 
establish the defense of estoppel by breach, the defendant has the burden of proof on each of the 
following propositions: 
1. Plaintiffs owed Defendants a duty of good faith and fair dealing, see 
Instruction No. ., 
2. Plaintiffs breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and 
3. Plaintiffs breached the covenant before Defendants breached the covenant. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Defendant High Mark has proven that 
Plaintiffs breached their covenant of good faith and fair dealing you must find for the defense on 
the breach of contract claims. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Defendant High Mark has not proven 
that Plaintiffs breached their covenant of good faith and fair dealing, then Defendant High Mark 
has not proved that affirmative defense in this case. 






Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. 14 
Mitigation and Avoidable Consequences 
Defendant High Mark has raised the defense of failure to mitigate or failure to "avoid 
consequences." A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the 
damage and prevent further damage. Any loss or damage that results from a failure to exercise 
such care cannot be recovered and is barred. 
Plaintiffs have a duty to mitigate, that is minimize or void the damages caused by the defendants' 
alleged conduct. Plaintiffs may not recover damages that they could have avoided without undue 
risk, burden, or humiliation. Likewise, Plaintiffs may not recover the damages for losses that 
were caused by or made worse by their own action or inaction. Under the doctrine of avoidable 
consequences, Plaintiffs have an active duty to mitigate their damages and they may not, either 
by action or inaction, aggravate the injury occasioned by the conduct. 
Damages are only recoverable for loss in the amount that the evidence proves with reasonable 
certainty, although the actual amount of damages need not be proved with precision. Any alleged 
damages which are only remote, possible or a matter of guess work are not recoverable. 
IDJI 9.14; Davis v. First Interstate Bank a/Idaho, NA., 115 Idaho 169, 765 P.2d 680 (1988); 






Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. 16 
Fraudulent Misrepresentation - Elements 
Plaintiffs have also claimed in this case that all defendants made fraudulent misrepresentations or 
failed to disclose material facts to the plaintiffs. Failure to disclose material facts is also known 
as "constructive fraud." 
To establish a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, Plaintiffs have the burden of proving each 
of the following propositions by clear and convincing evidence: 
1. That the defendant stated a fact to the plaintiff; 
2. The statement was false; 
3. The statement was material (See Instruction No.~; 
4. The defendant either knew the statement was false or was unaware of 
whether the statement was true at the time the statement was made; 
5. The plaintiff did not know that the statement was false; 
6. The defendant intended for the plaintiff to rely upon the statement and act 
upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated; 
7. The plaintiff did rely upon the truth of the statement; 
8. The plaintiffs reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances; 
9. The plaintiff suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false 
statement (See Instruction No.~; 
10. The nature and extent of the damages to the plaintiff, and the amount 
thereof. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each Plaintiffhas proved each of the 
elements of fraud by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for such plaintiff 
on this issue. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of the foregoing 
propositions has not been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be 
for the defendants. 
IDJI 4.60; Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, P.2d 303 (2000); 
Watts v. Krebbs, 131 Idaho 616, 962 P.2d 387 (1998); Magic Lantern Prods. Inc. v. Dolsot, 126 
Idaho 805,892 P.2d 480 (1995); Witt v. Jones, III Idaho 477, 722 P.2d 474 (1986); Umphrey v. 
Sprinkel, 106 Idaho 700, 682 P.2d 1247 (1983); Faw v. Greenwood, 101 Idaho 387, 613 P.2d 
1338 (1980); Smith v. King, 100 Idaho 331 597 P.2d 217 (1979); Kingv. McNeel, Inc., 94 Idaho 







Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. 17 
Constructive Fraud 
To establish a claim for constructive fraud, each Plaintiff has the burden of proving each ofthe 
following propositions by clear and convincing evidence: 
1. The defendant had a duty to provide certain information to the plaintiff 
(See Instruction No.~; 
2. The defendant did not disclose the information to the plaintiff; 
3. Without the undisclosed information the representations made by the 
defendant would be a misrepresentation. 
4. The undisclosed information was material (See Instruction No.~; 
5. The defendant knew the plaintiff was unaware of the undisclosed 
information; 
6. The plaintiff did not know the undisclosed information; 
7. The defendant intended for the plaintiff to rely upon the lack of 
information and act upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated; 
8. The plaintiff did act in reliance on the nonexistence of the undisclosed 
information; 
9. The plaintiffs reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances; 
10. The plaintiff suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the 
nonexistence ofthe undisclosed information (See Instruction No.~; 
11. The nature and extent of the damages to the plaintiff, and the amount 
thereof. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the elements of constructive 
fraud have been proved by clear and convincing evidence by each Plaintiff, then your verdict 
should be for such plaintiff. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of 
the foregoing propositions has not been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your 
verdict should be for the defendants. 
IDJI 4.60; Sowards v. Rathbun, 8 P.3d 1245 (Idaho 2000); G & M Farms v. Funk Irr. Co., 808 
P.2d 851 (Idaho 1991); Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 740 P.2d 1022 (Idaho 1987); 
Watts v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616, 962 P.2d 387 (1998); Faw v. Greenwood, 101 Idaho 387, 613 







Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. 19 
Evidence of Materiality 
If a statement concerning rents is false, the concealment or misrepresentation is 
not hannful and is not sufficiently material where the lessee is able, and is legally required, to 
pay the rent prescribed by the lease. 
37 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraud and Deceit, § 228 (2001); Exchange Realty Co. v. Bines, 18 N.E.2d 425 
(Mass. 1939), overruled on other grounds by Nalbandian v. Hanson Restaurant & Lounge, Inc., 






Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. 20 
Duty to Speak 
A defendant is under a duty to disclose to a plaintiff information known by the defendant if: 
1. the plaintiff does not know the information; 
2. the defendant knows the plaintiff does not know the information; and 
3. the information is vital, which means the information is so substantial and 
fundamental as to defeat the objective of the parties. 
To establish that Defendants owed a duty to disclose the information regarding the tenant's 
financial condition they must prove each of the above propositions by clear and satisfactory 
evidence, not by a mere preponderance of the evidence. 
See Sowards v. Rathbun, 8 P.3d 1245 (Idaho 2000); Hines v. Hines, 934 P.2d 20, 26 (Idaho 
1997); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McClelland, 63 P.2d 657,658 (Idaho 1936); Dennet v. 
Kuenzli, 936 P.2d 219,225 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997); Moore v. Mullen, 855 P.2d 70 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1993); Leydet v. City a/Mountain Home, 812 P.2d 755 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991); Mutual of 
Enumclaw Ins. Co., Inc. v. Wood By-Products, 695 P.2d 409,412 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984); Bailey 







Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. 21 
Correct Information 
Whether fraud occurred in this case depends on whether Plaintiffs knew or had 
reason to know from other information provided to them that the documents or statements were 
inaccurate. The elements of fraud include the hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement 
and justifiable reliance. In determining whether fraud occurred, you may consider information 
provided to the Plaintiffs and whether that information would have weighed against Plaintiffs 
believing and relying on the alleged misrepresentations. 






Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. 22 
Fraud/Constructive Fraud - Opinion 
Opinion cannot be the basis for a claim for fraud or constructive fraud. Sales talk or puffery also 
cannot be the basis of a claim for fraud or constructive fraud. 
Jordan v. Hunter, 865 P.2d 990, 998 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993); G & M Farms v. Funk Irr. Co., 808 






Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. __ 
Multiple Parties 
There are multiple parties in this case, and each party is entitled to have its claims or defenses 
considered on their own merits. You must evaluate the evidence fairly and separately as to each 
plaintiff and each defendant. Unless otherwise instructed, all instructions apply to each plaintiff 
and to each defendant. 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. _ 
MUltiple Plaintiffs 
Although there are seven plaintiffs in this action, that does not mean that they are equally entitled 
to recover or that any of them is entitled to recover. Defendants are entitled to a fair 
consideration of their defense against each plaintiff, just as each plaintiff is entitled to a fair 
consideration of their claim against Defendants. 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No._ 
Multiple Defendants 
Although there are five defendants in this action, that does not mean that they are equally liable 
or that any of them is liable. Each defendant is entitled to a fair consideration of their defense 
against each of plaintiffs' claims. If you conclude that one defendant is liable, that does not 
necessarily mean that one or more of the other defendants are liable. 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. __ 
Corporate Parties 
The corporations involved in this case are entitled to the same fair and unprejudiced treatment 
that an individual would be under like circumstances. You should decide this case with the same 
impartiality that you would use in deciding a case between individuals. 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No._ 
Breach of Contract 
Plaintiffs have alleged breach of contract against Defendant High Mark Development. To 
succeed on their breach of contract claim, Plaintiffs have the burden of proving each of the 
following propositions by a preponderance of the evidence: 
1. A contract existed between Plaintiffs and Defendant High Mark; 
2. Defendant High Mark breached the contract; 
3. Plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach-the breach of 
contract must be the "proximate cause" (as explained in instruction no. 
~ of the damages"; and 
4. The amount of the damages. 
The Court has found that a contract existed between plaintiffs and defendant High Mark. This 
means there is no contract claim in this case against the individual defendants. The contract in 
this case is the parties' Commercial/Investment Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement. 
The Court has also determined that the Lease Estoppel Certificate contained the following 
inaccurate statements: 
1. that the Lease had not been modified, supplemented, altered or amended in 
any respect; and 
2. that all minimum monthly rent has been paid to the end of the current 
calendar month, which is September 2007. 
You must determine whether these inaccurate statements "proximately caused" plaintiffs' alleged 
damages. In making this determination, you may consider other accurate information that was 
provided to the plaintiffs or their agent and that would have weighed against the plaintiffs relying 
on any inaccurate statements in the estoppel certificate. 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No._ 
Proximate Cause 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause which, in natural or probable 
sequence, produced the complained injury, loss or damage, and but for that cause the damage 
would not have occurred. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor 
in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a proximate cause if the injury, loss or 
damage likely would have occurred anyway. 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No._ 
Damages for Breach of Contract 
If you decide Plaintiffs are entitled to recover from Defendant High Mark for breach of contract, 
you must determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate Plaintiffs 
for damage proved by the evidence to have resulted from Defendant High Mark's alleged breach 
of contract: 
[Insert the elements of damage that have a basis in the evidence] 
Whether any of these elements of damage has been proved is for you to determine. 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions 
\~I Y 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No._ 
Materiality 
"Materiality" refers to the importance of the representation in determining the party's course of 
action. A representation is material if: 
(a) a reasonable person would attach importance to its existence or 
nonexistence in determining a choice of action in the transaction in 
question, or 
(b) the maker of the representation knows or has reason to know that the 
recipient is likely to regard the matter as important in determining the 
choice of action, whether or not a reasonable person would so consider. 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No._ 
Compensatory Damages 
If you decide that the defendants have proven their fraudulent misrepresentation claims, then you 
must also decide how much money is needed to fairly compensate the plaintiffs for any damages 
caused by those misrepresentations. You may award damages for the harm the plaintiffs 
experienced because of the defendants' fraud as long as you determine that the damages were 
reasonably foreseeable, and that the plaintiffs have proven these damages with reasonable 
certainty. The plaintiffs claim the following damages: 
1. Lost Profits 
2. Lost Earnings. 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No._ 
Compensatory Damages 
Damage awards cannot be based on speculation and conjecture. 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions 
I J... I ~h 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No._ 
Cautionary Instruction on Damages 
By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion as to whether 
the plaintiffs are entitled to damages. 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE DONOHUE ) 
O'SHEA, Trustees of the Thomas ) 
and Anne O'Shea Trust u/d/t ) 
DATED NOVEMBER 2, 1998; ) 
GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a ) 
California limited liability ) 
company; CALEB FOOTE, an ) 
individual; KATE LARKIN DONOHUE,) 
an Individual; JOHN KEVIN ) 
DONOHUE, an Individual; and SAN ) 
FRANCISCO RESIDENCE CLUB, INC., ) 
a California corporation, ) MINUTE ENTRY 





HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company;) 
GORDON ARAVE, individually and ) 
as Member of High Mark ) 
Development, LLC; JARED ARAVE, ) 
individually and as Member of ) 
High Mark Development, LLC; ) 
BENJAMIN ARAVE, Individually and) 
as Member of High Mark ) 
Development, LLC, and ) 
JOHN DOES I-X, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
On February 16, 2010, a pretrial conference hearing came 
before the Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, sitting in 
open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Ms. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
MINUTE ENTRY -1-
1262 
Mr. Greg Crockett and Mr. Sean Coletti appeared on behalf of 
the Plaintiffs. 
No one appeared on behalf of Defendant Dale Schneider. 
Mr. Rick Armstrong appeared on behalf of Defendants Gordon 
Arave, Jared Arave and Benjamin Arave. 
The parties discussed bifurcating the damages issue. It was 
determined that it would be best to do all issues at the same 
trial setting. 
Trial is currently scheduled for March 2, 2010. No pretrial 
motions are anticipated. No unusual questions of law are 
expected. Trial is scheduled to last 4-5 days. Witness lists, 
exhibit lists and jury instructions are due at this time. The 
Court will summon 50 prospective jurors. Each side will have 4 
peremptory challenges. 
The Court would like the parties to submit a jury instruction 
advising the status of The Children's Center. 
After discussion between the parties it was determined to 
start jury selection on March 1, 2010 at 2:00 p.m. Opening 
statements will start on March 2, 2010 at 10:00 a.m. 
Mr. Armstrong presented Defendants' motion in limine. Mr. 
Coletti presented argument in opposition to the motion. Mr. 
Crockett presented additional argument in opposition. Mr. 
Armstrong presented rebuttal argument. 
The Court will take the motion under advisement and issue an 
opinion as soon as possible. 
MINUTE ENTRY -2-
1263 
Court was thus adjourned. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of February, 2010, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to 
be delivered to the following: 
Gregory L. Crockett 
Sean J. Coletti 
PO Box 51219 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1219 
Richard J. Armstrong 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 E. South Temple, Ste. 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Marc J. Weinpel 
1975 Martha Ave. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Kipp L. Manwaring 
381 Shoup Ave., Ste.210 








IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JtV{jj)Ict1E8L1E?ISif~,hJ 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BON:NBV~.LE 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE DONAHUE 
O'SHEA, et al., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT, LLC, THE 
CHILDREN'S CENTER, INC, DALE A. 
SCHNEIDER, et at, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV -08-4025 
ORDER 
THIS MATTER has come before the Court on Defendant Motion in Limine to 
exclude opinion testimony. The Court heard oral argument and reviewed the record, including 
deposition excerpts of the proposed witnesses Paul Fife, leffNeeds and Brent Butikofer. Based 
on the record, and good cause appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' motion is denied at this time without 
prejudice to renew at the time of trial. The Court finds that certain opinion testimony, and the 
foundation therefore, was adequately disclosed in said witnesses' depositions. However, 
consistent with the Court's scheduling order, to the extent Plaintiff attempts to introduce expert 
opinions not disclosed in the depositions, such testimony will be precluded. Ultimately, the Court 
can not make that determination until any such testimony is offered. 
DATED this A day of February, 2010. 
ORDER - 1 
126:1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this k day of February, 2010, I did send a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct 
postage thereon: by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox; 
or by causing the same to be hand-delivered. 
Gregory L. Crockett 
Sean 1. Coletti 
428 Park Avenue 
P.O. Box 51219 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1219 
Richard 1. Armstrong 
WOOD CRAPO, LLC 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
ORDER-2 126G 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bonneville County, Idaho 
By ']/h/J/ 
Deputy Clerk 
HOPKINS RODEN CROCKETT 
HANSEN & HOOPES, PLLC 
Gregory L. Crockett, ISBN 1640 
Sean 1. Coletti, ISBN 7199 
428 Park Avenue 
P. O. Box 51219 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1219 
Telephone: 208-523-4445 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
10 FEB 22 P 4 :30 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE 
DONAHUE O'SHEA, Trustees of the 
Thomas and Anne O'Shea Trust u/dJt 
DATED NOVEMBER 2, 1998; 
GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a 
California limited liability company; 
CALEB FOOTE, an individual, 
KATE LARKIN DONAHUE, an 
individual, JOHN KEVIN 
DONAHUE, an individual, and SAN 
FRANCISCO RESIDENCE CLUB, 
INC., a California Corporation; 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company; GORDON ARA VE, 
individually and as Member of High 
Mark Development, LLC; JARED 
ARA VE, individually and as Member 
of High Mark Development, LLC; 
BENJAMIN ARA VE, individually 
and as Member of High Mark 
Development, LLC, and JOHN DOES 
I-X, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV -08-4025 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SUPPLEMENT 
TO PROPOSED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SUPPLEMENT TO PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 1 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys of record, the 
law finn of Hopkins Roden Crockett Hansen & Hoopes, PLLC, and, pursuant to the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 16, and the Amended Order and Notice Setting Jury 
Trial, submit and respectfully request the Court to adopt the attached supplemental Jury 
Instructions Nos. 37-49, and Amended Instruction No.5. 
DATED this 22nd day of February, 2010. 
l268 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SUPPLEMENT TO PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY, 
FACSIMILE OR ELECTRONIC MAIL TRANSMISSION 
I hereby ceIiify that a tme and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
on this date served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their 
name, either by mailing, hand delivery, telecopying or emailing to them a tme and correct 
copy of said document in a properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid; by hand delivery to them; or by facsimile or email transmission. 
DATED this 22nd day of Febmary, 2010. 
Richard J. Armstrong, Esq. • U.S. Mail 
Wood Crapo, LLC 0 Hand Delivery 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 0 Facsimile 
60 East South Temple 0 Email 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Email: llilrI11strQllg(dwoot,t~r<:!12o .coln 
Marc Weinpel, Esq. • U.S. Mail 
1975 Martha Avenue 0 Hand Delivery 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 0 Facsimile 
Emai I: III W C il]12-cl@J9.mllY1~.:.us 0 Email 
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PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SUPPLEMENT TO PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 3 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 37 
If a lessor shows leases, or states lease terms, to a prospective purchaser, 
without revealing rent concessions, the lessor misrepresents the gross rentals or 
conceals the true rentals, and such constitutes actionable fraud. The fact that a 
building is new, and that the rent concessions are such as are usually made to 
tenants moving into a new building, is of no importance where the rent 
concessions are not known to the purchaser of the building and the rentals are 
overstated by the amount of the concessions. 
37 Am.Jur.2d § 228 (2001). 
1270 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --- --- --- --- ----
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 38 
A person that undertakes to speak concerning a matter such as rents, 
profits, or income, either voluntarily or in response to inquiries, is bound not 
only to state truly what the person tells, but also not to suppress or conceal any 
facts within the person's knowledge that materially qualify those matters 
stated. Even though a contracting party, when expressing an opinion that the 
future rents will be a certain sum, does not know that an event is about to take 
place that would probably cause losses in future operations, but before signing 
an agreement the party learns of this factor, the party's failure to disclose what 
the party has discovered constitutes fraud. 
37 Am.Jur.2d § 227 (2001). 
1271 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --- --- --- --- ---
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 39 
Where a seller of real estate knows of facts materially affecting the value 
or desirability of the property and also knows that such facts are not known to, 
or within the reach of the diligent attention and observation of the buyer, the 
seller is under a duty to disclose them to the buyer. Such undisclosed facts are 
material if they would have a significant and measurable effect on market 
value. A seller's breach of duty to disclose facts materially affecting the value 
or desirability of the property that are not known to the buyer will give rise to a 
cause of action for both rescission and damages. 
37 Am.Jur.2d § 225 (2001). 
1272 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --- --- --- --- ---
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 40 
Where one is under an obligation to give information concerning the 
credit, financial standing, or solvency of another, or assumes such an 
obligation, or volunteers such information, or answers inquiries as to such 
matters, any intentional concealment or suppression of material facts may 
constitute actionable fraud. Concealing the financial condition of a person, in 
reference to whose credit inquiries are made, is a fraud, as is also the willful 
suppression of material facts in regard to the credit of a third person that the 
inquiring party is entitled to know. 
37 Am.Jur.2d § 232 (2001). 
1273 
Given --- Refused Modified Covered Other --- --- --- ----
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 41 
Concealment is fraud where it is affected by misleading and deceptive 
talk, acts, or conduct; where it is accompanied by misrepresentations; or 
where, in addition to the party's silence, there is any statement, word, or act on 
that party's part that tends affirmatively to a suppression of the truth, to a 
covering up or disguising of the truth, or to a withdrawal or distraction of a 
party's attention from the real facts, as then the line is overstepped, and the 
concealment becomes a fraud. 
37 Am.Jur.2d § 233 (2001). 
1274 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --- --- --- ---- ---
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 42 
It is not necessary that a false representation be made directly 
from the speaker to the hearer. A representation made to one person, 
with the intention that it reach another and be acted on by that other 
person, and which is acted upon by him to his injury, gives the person 
so acting upon it the same right to relief or redress as if the 
representation had been made to him directly. Furthermore, joint 
purchasers of property may have a claim for fraud based upon 
fraudulent statements perpetrated upon one of the joint purchasers, 
which fraud induced the other joint purchasers to buy the property. 
91 A.L.R. 1363, Application of principle that false representations made to one person 
with intentioll that another may act thereon are actionable ill favor of latter; Spadoni v. 
Maggenti, 8 P.2d 874 (Cal. App. 1932); lIenry v. Dennis, 95 Me. 24 (1901); Carvill v. 
Jacks,43 Ark. 454 (1884). 
1275 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --- --- --- --- ---
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 43 
A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to 
minimize the damage and prevent future damage. Any loss that results from a 
failure to exercise such care cannot be recovered. 
IDJI9.14 
1276 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other --- --- --- --- ---
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 44 
Opinion, sales talk, or puffery does not, standing alone, constitute the 
basis of a claim for fraud or constructive fraud. However, such talk may be 
actionable as an integral part of a representation of material fact when used to 
emphasize and induce reliance up Oil a representation. 
Jordal1 v. Hunter, 865 P.2d 990, 998 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993); G&M Farms v. Funk frr. 
Co., 808 P.2d 851, 859 (Idaho 1991); Casella v. Webb, 883 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1989). 
1277 
Given Refused --_. Modified Covered Other --- --- ---
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 45 
The rule stating that opinion, sales talk, or puffery does not constitute 
the basis of a claim for fraud or constructive fraud does not apply where the 
parties to the transaction do not stand on equal footing or have equal means of 
knowing the truth. 
G&M Farms v. Funk Jrr. Co., 808 P.2d 851, 859 (Idaho 1991). 
1278 
Given Refused Modified Covered Other ------ ------ ------ ------
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 46 
High Mark Development, LLC is a limited liability company, and, as 
such can act only through its officers and employees, and others designated by 
it as their agents. Corporate directors or officers are not liable merely by 
virtue of their office for fraud or other tortious wrongdoing committed by the 
corporation or its officers. Instead, for officers of the company to be held 
personally liable for any torts committed by the company, the evidence must 
establish that the officer(s) specifically directed, actively participated in, or 
knowingly acquiesced in the fraudulent activities claimed by the Plaintiffs. 
VFP VC v. Dakota Co., 141 Idaho 326, 109 P.3d 714 (2005); (see Defendants' Proposed Jury 
Instruction No.5). 
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Given --- Refused Modified Covered Other --- --- --- ---
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 47 
There are times when the form of a corporate entity is disregarded and 
liability is imposed on the corporation's officers. This is called the doctrine of 
"piercing the corporate veil." Two requirements must be met. First, there 
must be such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities 
of the corporation and individual no longer exist. Second, there must be a 
showing that, if the acts are treated as those of the corporation, an inequitable 
result will follow or that it would sanction a fraud or promote injustice. 
There are several factors which may be reviewed when considering 
whether the corporate veil should be pierced. For example, was there a lack of 
corporate formalities, such as directors' meetings; did the shareholders fail to 
submit the corporate contract and inventory revisions to the board of directors; 
and were business transactions completed without approval by any director or 
officer of the corporation. These factors are not exclusive because the 
conditions under which corporate entity may be disregarded vary according to 
the circumstances of the case. 
A director or officer of a corporation may be held personally liable for a 
tort committed by the corporation when he or she is sufficiently involved in the 
commission of the tort. Accordingly, the corporate veil does not have to be 
pierced in order to impose personal liability upon a corporate officer who 
knowingly participated in or acquiesced in a fraud. 
VEP VC. v. Dakota Co., 141 Idaho 326, 109 P.3d 714 (2005); 18B Am.Jur.2d, Corporations, § 1458 
(2004). 128 0 
Given --- Refused Modified Covered Other --- --- --- ---
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 48 
The fact that a corporate officer or director does not personally benefit 
from a transaction claimed to be fraudulent is not relevant in determining 
whether he or she is individually liable. 
188 Am.Jur.2d, Corporations, § 1633 (2004). 
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Given Refused Modified Covered Other --- --- --- --- ---
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 49 
A seller of property making representations to a buyer regarding the 
property is under a duty to make a full, truthful disclosure. The seller may not 
suppress or conceal any facts within his knowledge which may contradict in 
any way the representations so stated. If he speaks at all, the seller must make 
a full and fair disclosure. 
Russ v. Brown, 96 Idaho 369, 529 P.2d 765 (1974). 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
Plaintiffs are not pursuing their claims against Defendants The 
Children's Center, Inc.; The Idaho Children's Center, Inc.; and Matthew F. 
Smith in this trial. Defendants The Children's Center, Inc. and The Idaho 
Children's Center, Inc. are now defunct, and Defendant Matthew F. Smith has 
been granted a discharge in bankruptcy. You are to disregard all claims or 
possible claims against these Defendants in reaching your decision. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ---
If a lessor shows leases, or states lease terms, to a prospective purchaser, 
without revealing rent concessions, the lessor misrepresents the gross rentals or 
conceals the true rentals, and such constitutes actionable fraud. The fact that a 
building is new, and that the rent concessions are such as are usually made to 
tenants moving into a new building, is of no importance where the rent 
concessions are not known to the purchaser of the building and the rentals are 
overstated by the amount of the concessions. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
A person that undertakes to speak concerning a matter such as rents, 
profits, or income, either voluntarily or in response to inquiries, is bound not 
only to state truly what the person tells, but also not to suppress or conceal any 
facts within the person's knowledge that materially qualify those matters 
stated. Even though a contracting party, when expressing an opinion that the 
future rents will be a certain sum, does not know that an event is about to take 
place that would probably cause losses in future operations, but before signing 
an agreement the party learns of this factor, the party's failure to disclose what 
the party has discovered constitutes fraud. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
Where a seller of real estate knows of facts materially affecting the value 
or desirability of the property and also knows that such facts are not known to, 
or within the reach of the diligent attention and observation of the buyer, the 
seller is under a duty to disclose them to the buyer. Such undisclosed facts are 
material if they would have a significant and measurable effect on market 
value. A seller's breach of duty to disclose facts materially affecting the value 
or desirability of the property that are not known to the buyer will give rise to a 
cause of action for both rescission and damages. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
Where one is under an obligation to give information concerning the 
credit, financial standing, or solvency of another, or assumes such an 
obligation, or volunteers such information, or answers inquiries as to such 
matters, any intentional concealment or suppression of material facts may 
constitute actionable fraud. Concealing the financial condition of a person, in 
reference to whose credit inquiries are made, is a fraud, as is also the willful 
suppression of material facts in regard to the credit of a third person that the 
inquiring party is entitled to know. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
Concealment is fraud where it is affected by misleading and deceptive 
talk, acts, or conduct; where it is accompanied by misrepresentations; or 
where, in addition to the party's silence, there is any statement, word, or act on 
that party's part that tends affirmatively to a suppression of the truth, to a 
covering up or disguising of the truth, or to a withdrawal or distraction of a 
party's attention from the real facts, as then the line is overstepped, and the 
concealment becomes a fraud. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
I t is not necessary that a false representation be made directly 
from the speaker to the hearer. A representation made to one person, 
with the intention that it reach another and be acted on by that other 
person, and which is acted upon by him to his injury, gives the person 
so acting upon it the same right to relief or redress as if the 
representation had been made to him directly. Furthermore, joint 
purchasers of property may have a claim for fraud based upon 
fraudulent statements perpetrated upon one of the joint purchasers, 
which fraud induced the other joint purchasers to buy the property. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ---
A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to 
minimize the damage and prevent future damage. Any loss that results from a 
failure to exercise such care cannot be recovered. 
1280 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
Opinion, sales talk, or puffery does not, standing alone, constitute the 
basis of a claim for fraud or constructive fraud. However, such talk may be 
actionable as an integral part of a representation of material fact when used to 
emphasize and induce reliance upon a representation. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
The rule stating that opinion, sales talk, or puffery does not constitute 
the basis of a claim for fraud or constructive fraud does not apply where the 
parties to the transaction do not stand on equal footing or have equal means of 
knowing the truth. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
High Mark Development, LLC is a limited liability company, and, as 
such can act only through its officers and employees, and others designated by 
it as their agents. Corporate directors or officers are not liable merely by 
virtue of their office for fraud or other tortious wrongdoing committed by the 
corporation or its officers. Instead, for officers of the company to be held 
personally liable for any torts committed by the company, the evidence must 
establish that the officer(s) specifically directed, actively participated in, or 
knowingly acquiesced in the fraudulent activities claimed by the Plaintiffs. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
There are times when the form of a corporate entity is disregarded and 
liability is imposed on the corporation's officers. This is called the doctrine of 
"piercing the corporate veil." Two requirements must be met. First, there 
must be such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities 
of the corporation and individual no longer exist. Second, there must be a 
showing that, if the acts are treated as those of the corporation, an inequitable 
result will follow or that it would sanction a fraud or promote injustice. 
There are several factors which may be reviewed when considering 
whether the corporate veil should be pierced. For example, was there a lack of 
corporate formalities, such as directors' meetings; did the shareholders fail to 
submit the corporate contract and inventory revisions to the board of directors; 
and were business transactions completed without approval by any director or 
officer of the corporation. These factors are not exclusive because the 
conditions under which corporate entity may be disregarded vary according to 
the circumstances of the case. 
A director or officer of a corporation may be held personally liable for a 
tort committed by the corporation when he or she is sufficiently involved in the 
commission of the tort. Accordingly, the corporate veil does not have to be 
pierced in order to impose personal liability upon a corporate officer who 
knowingly participated in or acquiesced in a fraud. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
The fact that a corporate officer or director does not personally benefit 
from a transaction claimed to be fraudulent is not relevant in determining 
whether he or she is individually liable. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
A seller of property making representations to a buyer regarding the 
property is under a duty to make a full, truthful disclosure. The seller may not 
suppress or conceal any facts within his knowledge which may contradict in 
any way the representations so stated. If he speaks at all, the seller must make 
a full and fair disclosure. 
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OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' TRIAL BRIEF AND PROPOSED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS - 1 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, the law 
firm of Hopkins Roden Crockett Hansen & Hoopes, PLLC, Idaho Falls, Idaho, and 
submit this Objection to Defendants' Trial Brief and Proposed Jury Instructions. 
ARGUl\1ENT 
A. Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No.5. 
Defendants take part of this instruction from the case of VFP VC v. Dakota 
Co., 141 Idaho 326, 109 P.3d 714 (2005). The Court in that case found that an 
instruction similar to the one proposed by the Defendants was properly given. Plaintiffs 
ask that the pertinent language from the instruction in rFP be used here, instead of the 
language proposed by the Defendants. Furthermore, language pertaining to agency 
principles is already covered in the agency instructions, and is duplicative here. Thus, 
Plaintiffs request that Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No.5 read as follows: 
High Mark Development, LLC is a limited liability 
company, and, as such can act only through its officers and 
employees, and others designated by it as their agents. 
Corporate directors or officers are not liable merely by viltue 
of their office for fraud or other tortuous wrongdoing 
committed by the corporation or its officers. Instead, for 
officers of the company to be held personally liable for any 
torts committed by the company, the evidence must establish 
that the officer(s) specifically directed, actively participated 
in, or knowingly acquiesced in the fraudulent activities 
claimed by the Plaintiffs. 
B. Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No.8. 
Defendants Proposed Instruction No.8 cites Idaho Code § 54-2086 of the 
Idaho Real Estate License Law. Section 54-2086 serves to establish the duties of a 
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brokerage and consequent liabilities to a buyer in a non-agent / principal situation. 
Section 54-2086 deals with situations in which a buyer is "not represented by a brokerage 
in a regulated real estate transaction[.]" In such situations, the buyer remains a 
"customer" and not a "client," and the brokerage and its licensees are not "agents" of the 
customer. See I.e. § 54-2086. 
Defendants have consistently claimed that no written agency agreement 
was entered between the Plaintiffs and Jeff Needs. Assuming this is indeed the case, the 
actions or knowledge of Needs as a non-agent cannot and should not be imputed to the 
Plaintiffs as mere "customers." See also I.e. § 54-2083 (defining "customer" as "a buyer 
or seller, or prospective buyer or seller, who is not represented in an agency relationship 
in a regulated real estate transaction."). This Court has already determined that it is the 
actual knowledge of the Plaintiffs, not Jeff Needs, that is at issue here. Defendants' 
Proposed Jury Instruction No.8 improperly turns the COllli's decision on its head, 
suggesting that it is the actual knowledge of a non-agent which is important. As such, 
this jury instruction should not be allowed. The proposed instruction misstates the 
statute, the actual circumstances and is argumentative. 
e. Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions No. 11-13. 
Plaintiffs did not breach any contract or covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing by requesting language for the Estoppel Certificate. Defendants' argument 
concerns Plaintiffs' interpretation of "Triple Net" charges under the Lease Agreement as 
including management fees and insurance costs; which has been historically charged and 
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' TRIAL BRIEF AND PROPOSED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS - 3 
sometimes paid by the Tenant. Plaintiffs requested that the Estoppel contain language to 
this effect to avoid ambiguity and future questions. See Statement ~f Facts in Support ~f 
Defendants' Cross Motion for SUl11l11a1Y Judgment, p. 18,21. The Lease Agreement did 
not define "Triple Net" other than to state that "all costs associated with the use of this 
building [are] borne by Lessee." Plaintiffs' interpretation that "triple-net" included 
management fees and insurance costs was consistent with their understanding that the 
tenant was already paying these fees. Plaintiffs based their interpretation on the industry-
standard meaning of "triple-net." 
Defendants cite Ervin COllstr. Co. v. Van Orden, 125 Idaho 738, 874 P.2d 
549 (Ct. App. 1992), arguing that Plaintiffs' interpretation and request somehow 
constituted a breach, and obviated the need for the Defendants to be truthful in the 
Estoppel as it concerned payment of rent. Defendants have seriously misapplied the law. 
In Van Orden, the issue was whether homeowners were obligated to continue paying a 
contractor who acknowledged defects in his construction of a home. The Court stated: 
"A party's material failure of performance has the effect of preventing the other's duty 
from becoming due, at least temporarily, and of discharging that duty when the condition 
can no longer occur." Id. at 741 (emphasis added). The Court cited the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, § 237, for an illustration: 
In an important category of disputes over failure of 
performance, one party asserts the right to payment on the 
ground that he has completed his performance, while the 
other party refuses to pay on the ground that there has been an 
uncured material failure of performance. A typical example 
is that of the building contractor who claims from the owner 
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Jd. 
payment of the unpaid balance under a construction contract. 
In such cases it is common to state the issue, not in tenns of 
whether there has been an uncured material failure by the 
contractor, but in terms of whether there has been substantial 
perfonnance by him .... 
Van Orden's discussion ofa "material failure of performance" is 
completely inapplicable here. There is not now, nor has there ever been, an allegation of 
a "material failure of performance" by the Plaintiffs. There is no dispute that the 
Plaintiffs fulfilled their part of the bargain by paying for the property. Plaintiffs' request 
of language consistent with an "interpretation" of an undefined term in the Lease 
Agreement is not a breach of anything, and it certainly did not excuse the "material" 
breach by the Defendants. Since Defendants have never shown facts supporting their 
claim of estoppel by breach, Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction Nos. 11 and 12 
should be modified to omit this affirmative defense, and Defendants' Proposed Jury 
Instruction No. 13 should not be allowed. 
D. Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. 14. 
Defendants have grossly enlarged the standard mitigation instruction in 
their Proposed Jury Instruction No. 14. This Court should apply the standard mitigation 
instructi on in this case instead of Defendants' : 
A person who has been damaged must exercise 
ordinary care to minimize the damage and prevent further 
damage. Any loss that results from a failure to exercise such 
care cannot be recovered. 
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Defendants' discussion of "avoidable consequences" is unnecessary. 
"Avoidable consequences" is simply another name for "mitigation." See Davis v. First 
Interstate Bank of Idaho, N.A., 115 Idaho 169, 172, 765 P.2d 680 (1988) ("The duty to 
mitigate, also known as the doctrine of avoidable consequences .... "). Defendants' 
proposed instruction on mitigation is confusing. On the other hand, the standard 
instruction is clear, concise, and will not confuse the jury. 
E, Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions No. 16 and 17. 
Defendants have never supported their argument that each of the joint 
plaintiff investors, who are tenants in common, have to prove each element of fraud. 
This argument presumes that Plaintiffs had no relationship to each other as joint-
purchasers or tenants in common. It is well established that a principal can assert a cause 
of action for fraud based upon false misrepresentations made to his agent. See, e.g., 
Young v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 123 Misc. 2d 580, 474 N.Y.S.2d 886 (N.Y. 1983); 
Hallam v. Bailey, 166 P. 874 (Okla. 1917); Com. v. Call, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 515 (1839). 
Furthermore, "it is immaterial whether false representations were made to only one of the 
plaintiffs without communicating them to the other pmiy. Fraud perpetrated upon either 
one of joint purchasers of property may warrant a rescission of the conveyance thereof." 
Spadoni v. Maggellti, 8 P.2d 874 (Cal. App. 1932). This same principal is expressed 
consistently in 91 A.L.R. 1363, i.e., "it is not necessary, to support an action for false 
representation, that the representation should have been addressed directly to the plaintiff, 
but it is sufficient if it was made with the intent to influence every person to whom it 
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might be communicated, or who might read or hear of it, as the latter class of persons 
would be in the same position as those to whom it was directly communicated." (citing 
Carvill v. Jacks, 43 Ark. 454 (1884»; "A representation made to one person, with the 
intention that it shall reach the ears of another and be acted on by him, and which does 
reach him, and is acted upon by him to his injury, gives the person so acting upon it the 
same right to relief or redress as if it had been made to him directly." (citing HelllY v. 
Dennis, 95 Me. 24 (1901». 
Accordingly, Defendants' statements in their Proposed Jury Instructions 
No. 16 and 17 that "each Plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following 
propositions" is suspect. In order to clear misconceptions that each Defendant needed to 
be in the direct line of the misrepresentation, Plaintiffs propose the following additional 
instruction: 
It is not necessary that a false representation be made 
directly from the speaker to the hearer. A representation 
made to one person, with the intention that it reach another 
and be acted on by that other person, and which is acted upon 
by him to his injury, gives the person so acting upon it the 
same right to relief or redress as if the representation had been 
made to him directly. Furthermore, joint purchasers of 
property may have a claim for fraud based upon fraudulent 
statements perpetrated upon one of the joint purchasers, 
which fraud induced the other joint purchasers to buy the 
property. 
Furthermore, Defendants have confusted Plaintiffs' claim of fraud by 
nondisclosure in their Instructions No. 16 and 17. The elements for this claim can be 
found in Watts v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616,619,962 P.2d 387 (1998): "To establish fraud 
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Watts was required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that there was 
nondisclosure, that she relied upon Krebs' nondisclosure, that her reliance was material to 
the transaction, and that she was damaged as a proximate result of the nondisclosure." 
Plaintiffs' instruction on fraud by nondisclosure is based on Watts and is easier to 
understand, and should be applied by the Court. 
F. Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. 19. 
Defendants cite to a sentence from 37 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraud and Deceit, § 228 
(2001), which states that "If a statement concerning rents is false, the concealment or 
misrepresentation is not harmful and is not sufficiently material where the lessee is able, 
and is legally required, to pay the rent prescribed by the lease." This statement must be 
taken in the context of the case from which it comes, Exchange Realty Co. v. Bines, 18 
N .E.2d 425 (Mass. 1939). Bines held that, where the buyer of the building was given a 
false rent statement, the tenant was paying less than the amount stipulated in the lease due 
to a rent concession, and (a) the lease had not been set aside, (b) the tenant was able to 
pay the required total rental, and (c) the tenant had not been released from paying the 
required total rental, no harm had been done to the buyer of the building. ld. at 428-29. 
By contrast, (a) The Children's Center paid no rent for several months, (b) it was unable 
to pay the required total rental, (c) this fact was not only undisclosed to the Plaintiffs but 
was covered up by means of a Promissory Note for "rent deferral" after the unpaid rent 
period, and (d) On October 18,2007 the Children's Center was forever released from 
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paying this rent. Other than in American Jurisprudence, Bines has been cited for this law 
a total of two times in Massachusetts and nowhere else. Bines does not apply to this case. 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. 19 should not be allowed. 
G. Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. 20. 
Defendants discussion in their Trial Brief of the duty to speak mentions 
several alternative situations in which a party may be under a duty to speak. Defendants 
do not mention or cite, however, the most extensive Idaho case on the duty to speak, 
Watts v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616,620,962 P.2d 387 (1998). The Court in Watts mentions a 
total of seven situations in which a duty to speak may arise. Again, each situation is 
separated by an "or," meaning the Court is speaking in the alternative. However, 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. 20 improperly lumps three of these situations 
together and treats them as one, as if they were elements of the only possible situation in 
which a duty to speak could arise. This instruction completely ignores the other four 
possible situations. Hence, this instruction should be modified to take into account all of 
the various situations in which a duty to speak may be found as shown in Watts, and the 
various situations should be treated as altematives and not as elements. 
H. Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. 21. 
With regard to other information provided to the Plaintiffs which may have 
mitigated against justifiable reliance, Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. 21 only 
explains part of the law. Defendants' instruction states that a jury "may consider 
information provided to the Plaintiffs and whether that information would have weighed 
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against Plaintiffs believing and relying on the alleged misrepresentations." However, the 
jury must consider only what the Plaintiffs "actually examined," not what they may have 
received and what was theoretically available. This law is clearly stated in Watson v. 
Weick, 141 Idaho 500, 506,112 P.3d 788 (2005), Faw v. Greenwood, 101 Idaho 387, 613 
P.2d l338 (1980), and Snow's Auto Supply, inc. v. DOI·maier, 108 Idaho 73, 696 P.2d 924 
(Ct. App. 1985). Plaintiffs request that any instruction to this effect contain language that 
is consistent with the case law. 
I. Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. 22. 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. 22 discusses opinion and sales 
talk or puffery. Plaintiffs understand that this Court has decided that the LoopNet ad and 
certain statements of Paul Fife may constitute opinion and sales talk. Defendants agree 
that, standing alone, these may not constitute the basis for a claim of fraud. However, 
Defendants have based their claims of fraud on consistent, continuous statements. When 
the LoopNet ad and statements from Paul Fife are combined with fraudulent statements 
in the Estoppel and the Rent and CAM Charge document, they contribute to Plaintiffs' 
belief in the fraudulent statements. See Casella v. Webb, 883 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 
1989) ("What might be innocuous "puffery" or mere statement of opinion standing alone 
may be actionable as an integral part of a representation of material fact when used to 
emphasize and induce reliance upon a representation."); Limantour v. Cray inc., 432 F. 
Supp. 2d 1129, 1146-47 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (same). As such, this Court should use the 
following jury instruction regarding opinion, sales talk or puffery: 
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' TRIAL BRIEF AND PROPOSED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS - 10 
stated above. 
Opinion, sales talk, or puffery may not, standing alone, 
constitute the basis of a claim for fraud or constructive fraud. 
However, such talk may be actionable as an integral part of a 
representation of material fact when used to emphasize and 
induce reliance upon a representation. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs request that the Court incorporate the jury instruction changes as 
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of February, 2010. 
HOPKINS RODEN CROCKETT 
HANSEN & HOOPES, PLLC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY, 
FACSIMILE OR ELECTRONIC MAIL TRANSMISSION 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
on this date served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their 
name, either by mailing, hand delivery, telecopying or emailing to them a true and correct 
copy of said document in a properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid; by hand delivery to them; or by facsimile or email transmission. 
DATED this 22nd day of February, 2010. 
Richard J. Armstrong, Esq. • U.S. Mail 
Wood Crapo, LLC 0 Hand Delivery 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 0 Facsimile 
60 East South Temple 0 Email 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 I 11 
Email: rj armstrong((l,\voodcrapo.coll1 
Marc Weinpel, Esq. • U.S. Mail 
1975 Martha Avenue 0 Hand Delivery 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 0 Facsimile 
Email: l11wei npe I C!£..t~lm i I ytc.us 0 Email 
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From:High Mark O'Shea 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Richard 1. Armstrong, ISBN 5548 
Brinton M. Wilkins, pro hac vice 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 366-6060 
Facsimile: (801) 366-6061 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company; GORDON ) 
ARA VE, individually and as Member of High ) 
Mark Development, LLC; JARED ARA VE, ) 
individually and as Member of High Mark ) 
Development, LLC; BENJAMIN D. ARA VE, ) 
individually and as Member of High Mark ) 
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THE CHILDREN'S CENTER, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation; THE IDAHO CillLDREN'S ) 
CENTER, INC., an Idaho corporation, ) 
) 
Third-Party Defendants. ) 
Pursuant to paragraph III. 1 of the Court' sAmended Order and Notice Setting Jury 
Trial, Defendants object to Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instructions, as specified herein. 
Defendants request that the instructions objected to be stricken or modified as requested. 
OBJECTIONS 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO.5: Defendants object to this instruction on 
grounds it is incomplete and therefore confusing and misleading to the jury. Because of its 
incomplete statement, the jury could conclude that the reason the case is not being pursued 
against the named individual and entities is because there is no liability. Defendants therefore 
request that if this instruction is given, the following language be added: "Plaintiffs are not 
pursuing their claims against these Defendants in this trial because Matthew Smith has filed for 
personal bankruptcy, and the Children's Center, Inc. and its related entity, the Idaho Children's 
Center, Inc., are defunct and without assets. 
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PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO.6: This instruction is inaccurate. This 
Court ruled in its January 2010 Memorandum Decision and Order that there were two inaccurate 
aspects of the October 17,2007 Estoppel Certificate: (1) there had been no modifications to the 
lease, and (2) all rent had been paid. The Court specifically found that there were issues of fact, 
i. e., jury questions, about whether the tenant was in default at the time the estoppel certificate 
was signed. See Mem. Dec. and Order, at 8 ("[W]hether the tenant was in default at the time of 
the Estoppel Certificate remains an issue of fact"). Plaintiffs' Instruction No.6 contains two 
inaccurate references, which are numbered paragraphs 2 and 4. These paragraphs should be 
deleted from the instruction. Furthermore, the opening sentence in proposed instruction number 
6 should read as follows: "The following representations contained in the October 17, 2007 lease 
estoppel certificate were, in part, inaccurate." The "in part" language is necessary in order to 
make the instruction consistent with this Court's ruling at page 8 of its Memorandum Decision 
and Order. See id., at 8 ("As the evidence reflects, the foregoing representations were false, at 
least ill part." (Emphasis added». 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO.7: This instruction is inaccurate. This 
Court found that the inaccurate statements in the estoppel certificate were in breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This Court did not rule that the presentation of 
the inaccurate information was not in good faith. The final sentence of instruction number 7 
should therefore read as follows: "The presentation ofthe false and misleading statements 
mentioned in Instruction No. __ constituted both a breach ofthe implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing and a breach ofthe contract by Defendant High Mark Development, LLC." 
See Mem. Dec. and Order, at 9. 
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PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO.8: This instruction is incomplete and does 
not accurately state the elements of a breach of contract claim as it relates to the issues of 
damages and the causation of damages. See Challis Irr. Co. v. State, 107 Idaho 338, 343,689 
P.2d 230, 235 (Ct. App. 1984). The instruction fails to state that the aggrieved party in a breach 
of contract claim "must show that his loss actually resulted from the breach." See id. The 
instruction is incomplete to the extent it fails to identify all of the elements of a breach of 
contract claim. While the Court found that two of those elements were shown in summary 
judgment, the instruction should indicate as much and then explain to the jury what its obligation 
is with regard to the breach of contract claim. Defendants' proposed jury instruction number 9 
accurately reflects the status of plaintiffs' breach of contract claim and what the duties of the jury 
are with regard to that claim, as found by this Court in its Memorandum Decision and Order, and 
specifically page 9 of that decision and order. 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO.9: This instruction is an incomplete 
statement of the law of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The 
instruction fails to state that the covenant requires that the parties perform in good faith the 
obligations imposed by their agreement, and a violation of the covenant occurs only when either 
party violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the contract. Defendants' proposed 
jury instruction number 11 is a more accurate statement of the law. 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 10: This instruction is unnecessary and is 
incomplete and therefore misleading to the jury. If this instruction is given, the following 
language from the Court's memorandum decision should be added: "Inaccurate information in 
the estoppel certificate does not establish a right of the plaintiffs to recover from the defendants. 
Plaintiffs must still prove that such inaccurate information proximately caused their alleged 
4 
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damages in this case. In making this determination, you may consider other accurate information 
that was provided to the plaintiffs or their agent and that would have weighed against the 
plaintiffs relying on any inaccurate statements in the estoppel certificate." See Mem. Dec. and 
Order, at 9-10. 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 11: See Defendants' Objection to 
Plaintiffs' Instruction No.8. 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 12: This instruction is unnecessary, is a 
question of fact, and intrudes upon the province of the jury. The statement is also inaccurate. 
While the Court stated in its memorandum decision that "inaccurate documents 
were clearly submitted on behalf of High Mark," the Court was clear in stating that the question 
of fraud is a question of fact. Respectfully. Defendants submit that the Court's statement in this 
regard at page 12 of its memorandum decision was gratuitous and unnecessary to its ruling on 
summary judgment. Plaintiffs' proposed instruction number 12 is therefore an inappropriate 
commentary on the evidence and intrudes on the role of the jury in determining questions of fact. 
The statement is inaccurate because the document was not "provided to the 
Plaintiffs," because not all off the plaintiffs viewed the referenced documents. Indeed, several of 
the plaintiffs testified in deposition that they did not see any such documents. Instruction No. 12 
should not be given. 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 13: This instruction is unnecessary, is a 
question of fact, and intrudes upon the province of the jury. The statement is also inaccurate and 
out of context. The Court did not state that such statement in the referenced document was false. 
The Court stated that the documents represented a certain amount of rent and CAM charges 
received, "when in fact that amount of rent had not been received." This instruction is an 
5 
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inappropriate commentary on the evidence in this case. Whether the rent and cam charge sheet 
was false is a jury question. 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 15: This instruction is confusing as to 
paragraph (d), and is otherwise inconsistent with the current state of the law as stated in Sowards 
v. Rathbun, 134 Idaho 702,8 PJd 1245 (2000). In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court identified 
the circumstances where a duty to disclose will arise: 
A party may be under a duty to disclose: (1) if there is a fiduciary or other similar 
relation of trust and confidence between the two parties; (2) in order to prevent a 
partial statement of the facts from being misleading; or (3) if a fact known by one 
party and not the other is so vital that if the mistake were mutual the contract 
would be voidable, and the party knowing the fact also knows that the other does 
not know it. 
Id., at 707,8 P.3d at 1250. 
Plaintiffs' proposed instruction at paragraph (d) mentions "customs of the trade." 
Plaintiffs have not identified any expert witness that will testify regarding any such customs of 
the trade. The instruction will therefore be inconsistent with the evidence at trial. Defendants 
submit that the duty to speak is more clearly set out at Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. 
20, and request that their instruction in this regard be given to the jury. 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 16: This instruction is not an accurate 
statement ofthe law of constructive fraud. This instruction fails to state that one element of the 
claim includes materiality of the non-disclosed fact. Constructive fraud in Idaho has its genesis 
in the Second Restatement of Torts § 551. That section states that "[o]ne who fails to disclose to 
another a fact that he knows may justifiably induce the other to act or refrain from acting in a 
business transaction is subject to the same liability to the other as though he had represented 
the nonexistence of the matter that he has failed to disclose, if, but only if, he is under a duty to 
the other to exercise reasonable care to disclose the matter in question." Restatement (Second) of 
6 
from:High MarK O'Shea 801 388 8081 10 18:35 11487 P.008/012 
Torts § 551 (1977) (emphasis added). Section 550 of the Second Restatement states: "One party 
to a transaction who by concealment or other action intentionally prevents the other from 
acquiring material information is subject to the same liability to the other, for pecuniary loss as 
though he had stated the nonexistence of the matter that the other was thus prevented from 
discovering." 'The undisclosed facts must therefore be shown to be material, similar to the 
elements of the claim for fraudulent misrepresentation. 
Plaintiffs' instruction number 16 is inaccurate because it fails to state that the 
reliance on the non-disclosed fact was justifiable or reasonable. As set forth in section 551 of the 
Second Restatement, fraud by non-disclosure is the same as fraud by an affirmative 
misrepresentation, with the only difference being proof of a duty to disclose the material fact. 
See Restatement (Second) o/Torts § 551 (1977). Fraud by affirmative misrepresentation includes 
justifiable reliance, or a right to rely on the misrepresentation, by the hearer of the 
misrepresentation. See Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 996 P.2d 
303 (2000). 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 17: This instruction is incomplete, and 
therefore misleading. To be accurate and not misleading to the jury, the Court should instruct the 
jury that the question of fraud turns on the issue of whether plaintiffs knew from other 
information that the documents were inaccurate. See Mem. Dec. and Order, at 12. The way 
plaintiffs' instruction is written potentially renders irrelevant other information that was provided 
to the plaintiffs prior to closing, and whether that information corrected previously provided 
information that is shown to be inaccurate. 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 18: This instruction is unnecessary, is 
duplicative, is misleading, and is language that is taken out of context of a decision of the Idaho 
7 
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Supreme Court. The lack of due diligence is already covered in Plaintiffs' proposed jury 
instruction number 16. It is therefore unnecessary and duplicative. If either proposed instruction 
numbers 16 or 17 are given, it is important, so as to make the instructions not misleading, to 
include an instruction that the jury may consider other information that was provided to the 
plaintiffs that would have corrected the prior alleged misrepresentations, or gave the plaintiffs 
and their agent reason to know that the prior alleged misrepresentations were inaccurate. See 
Mem. Dec. and Order at 13 and 14. 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 19: This instruction is an inappropriate 
and improper commentary on the evidence. It also intrudes upon the province of the jury. The 
question of whether the evidence has established the elements of fraud is reserved for a jury. See 
King v. King, 136 Idaho 905, 42 P.3d 698 (2002). There are issues of fact as to whether the 
estoppel certificate was submitted to the plaintiffs with knowledge that it would be relied upon 
by the plaintiffs in connection with the purchase of the property in question. There is evidence 
that will be presented at trial that disputes this prong of Plaintiffs' fraud claim. It is therefore for 
the jury to decide whether, in fact, the estoppel was provided with the knowledge it would be 
relied upon by the plaintiffs. 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 20: Defendants' instructions on its 
affirmative defenses are more accurate statements as to Defendants' affirmative defenses that can 
be presented to the jury for determination. Those instruction include Defendants' proposed 
instruction numbers 12, 13, and 14. 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NOS. 26-29: This instruction is an 
inappropriate commentary on the evidence, is unnecessary, and intrudes upon the province of the 
jury. It is for the jury to determine whether High Mark Development is responsible for the 
8 
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actions of its agents, including its attorneys, employees, and other agents, and whether certain 
individuals were the authorized agents of their principals. 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 30: This instruction is confusing and 
misleading to the jury. The instruction references liability of an agent, but there is no claim in 
the case that alleges liability of the agent. The claims against the individual defendants are based 
on alleged active participation in alleged fraud, not because of an agency relationship. Moreover, 
some of the named agents are not parties to this lawsuit, and reference to their liability will 
necessary confuse the jury. 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 32: This instruction is confusing and 
misleading. This instruction runs directly counter to those instructions proposed by plaintiffs 
dealing with fraud and constructive fraud. Those instructions use the phrase "If you find," and 
based on this instruction, the jury could be mislead to apply a different burden of proof on 
plaintiffs' fraud claims. The standard of proof as stated in this instruction is a preponderance of 
the evidence. This is not the standard for the fraud claims. 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 33: This instruction is unnecessary and is 
not supported by any evidence. 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 35: This instruction should not be given as 
it instructs the jury on rescission, which is an equitable claim, and therefore not a jury question. 
The instruction also includes unnecessary information about the amount of damages claimed by 
the plaintiffs, and the amount of damages is a question for the jury. The instruction should not 
include any commentary about dollar figures and interest rates. 
PLAINTIFFS' INSTRUCTION NO. 36: This instruction should not be given 
because rescission is an equitable claim, and therefore not a jury question. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of February, 2010. 
WOOD CRAPO LtC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 220d day of February, 2010, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS was served by email to the following: 
HOPKINS RODEN CROCKETT HANSEN & HOOPES, PLLC 
Gregory L. Crockett 
Sean J. Coletti 
428 Park A venue 
P.O. Box 51219 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1219 
Marc J. Weinpel 
1975 Martha Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
S.IWPDATAlPlEADlNO\HIGH MARKO'SHEA.OBJECTlONS TO PLAImlFFS' PROPOSED JURy tNSTIlUcnONS.wpd 
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From: FIRM 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Richard 1. Annstrong, ISBN 5548 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 366-6060 
Facsimile: (801) 366-6061 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE DONAHUE 
O'SHEA, Trustees of the Thomas and Anne 
O'Shea Trust uldlt DATED NOVEMBER 2, 
1998; GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a 
California limited liability company; CALEB 
FOOT, an individual, KATE LARKIN 
DONAHUE, an individual, JOHN KEVIN 
DONAHUE, an individual, and SAN 




HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company; GORDON 
ARA VE, individually and as Officer of High 
Mark Development, LLC; BENJAMIN D. 































Case No. CV -08-4025 
Judge Tingey 
From: FIRM 801 388 8081 o 09: 10 11489 P.003/009 
Pursuant to Idaho R. Civ. P. SICa) and paragraph II.4 of the Court'sAmended 
Order and Notice Setting Jury Trial, Defendants High Mark Development, LLC, Gordon Arave, 
Benjamin D. Arave, and Jared Arave, by and through their counsel of record, hereby submit the 
following supplemental requested jury instructions. 
Defendants J Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions-2 
'~/71 \/ 
From:FIRH 801 388 8081 10 09:11 1489 P.004/00S 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. __ 
Evidence of Fraud 
Before this trial commenced, the Court ruled that the LoopNet ad, marked as Exhibit 4, does not 
support a claim of fraud, because the purpose of the ad was to catch the attention of potential 
purchasers and to invite further inquiry. As a matter oflaw, it was unreasonable for the Plaintiffs 
to rely on this ad for purposes of deciding to purchase the property in question. Therefore, in 
deciding whether fraud was committed in this case, you are instructed to ignore the LoopNet ad. 
Defendants I Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions-3 
From: FIRM 801 366 6061 o 09:11 1469 P.005/009 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. 26 
Evidence of Fraud 
Before this trial commenced, the Court ruled that the LoopNet ad, marked as Exhibit 4, does not 
support a claim of fraud, because the purpose of the ad was to catch the attention ofpotentiai 
purchasers and to invite further inquiry. As a matter of law, it was unreasonable for the Plaintiffs 
to rely on this ad for purposes of deciding to purchase the property in question. Therefore, in 
deciding whether fraud was committed in this case, you are instructed to ignore the LoopNet ad. 







t .... /); A • 
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Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. __ 
Evidence of Fraud 
Before this trial commenced, the Court also ruled that statements made by Gordon Arave to High 
Mark's agent, Paul Fife, to the effect that the Children's Center was a good tenant and had not 
missed any rent payments, do not constitute a representation of fact but rather an opinion. 
Gordon Arave did not communicate such alleged statements directly to any representative of 
Plaintiffs. The Court ruled that such statements do not support Plaintiffs' claims offraud. 
Therefore, in deciding whether fraud was committed in this case, you are instructed to ignore any 
such statements. 
Defendants 'Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions-4 
From: FIRM 801 ass SOSl o 09:11 1I4S9 P.007/009 
Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. 27 
Evidence of Fraud 
Before this trial commenced, the Court also ruled that statements made by Gordon Arave to High 
Mark's agent, Paul Fife, to the effect that the Children's Center was a good tenant and had not 
missed any rent payments, do not constitute a representation of fact but rather an opinion. 
Gordon Arave did not communicate such alleged statements directly to any representative of 
Plaintiffs. The Court ruled that such statements do not support Plaintiffs' claims of fraud. 
Therefore, in deciding whether fraud was committed in this case, you are instructed to ignore any 
such statements. 
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DATED this 23rd day of February, 2010. 
WOOD CRAPO LLC -----
S;\~DATAIPLEADING\HIGH MARI( O'SHEA,OEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAl JURY INsmUCTIONS-l ,wpd 
Defendants I Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions-5 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 23rd day of February, 2010, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS was served by email to the following: 
HOPKINS RODEN CROCKETT HANSEN & HOOPES, PLLC 
Gregory L. Crockett 
Sean J. Coletti 
428 Park Avenue 
P.O. Box 51219 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1219 
Marc 1. Weinpel 
1975 Martha Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THOMAS 0' SHEA and ANNE 
DONAHUE 0' SHEA, Trustees of the 
Thomas and Anne 0' Shea Trust uJd/t 
DATED NOVEMBER 2, 1998; 
GRANDVIEW CREDIT. LLC, a 
California limited liability company; 
CALEB FOOTE, an individual, 
KATE LARKIN DONAHUE, an 
individual, JOHN KEVIN 
DONAHUE, an individual, and SAN 
FRANCISCO RESIDENCE CLUB, 
INC., a California corporation; 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company; GORDON ARA VE, 
individually and as Member of High 
Mark Development, LLC; JARED 
ARA VE, indIvidually and as Member 
of High Mark Development, LLC; 
BENJAMIN ARA VE, individually 
and as Member of High Mark 
Development, LLC, and JOHN DOES 
I-X, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-08-4025 
ORDER 
THIS CAUSE came on regularly for hearing before the Court on 
Wednesday, February 10, 2010, the Honorable Joel E. Tingey presiding, on Plaintiffs' 
Motion in Limine to exclude the expert testimony of E. Robert Miller. Plaintiffs and 
ORDER - 1 1297 
Defendants appeared through their respective counsel of record. Based on the record, 
good cause appearing therefore and the Court being fully advised in the premises: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion is denied at this time 
without prejudice to renew at the time of trial. The Court finds, however, that to the 
extent Defendants attempt to introduce expert opinion relating to Defendants' claims 
which were rejected by the Court in its Memorandum Decision and Order all Motions for 
Summary Judgment, such testimony will be precluded. 
DATED this 2 t-J day of February, 2010. 
ORDER - 2 
1298 
CERTIFICATE OF ENTRY 
I, the undersigned and Clerk of the above-entitled court, hereby certify that 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d), a copy of the foregoing was duly posted 
by first class mail to the defendant's and to plaintiffs counsel at the names and addresses 
stated below. 
DATED this ~ ~ day of February, 2010. 
RONALD LONGMORE, CLERK 
By ~v 
Deputy Clerk 
Gregory L. Crockett, Esq. 0 U.S. Mail 
Hopkins Roden Crockett • Courthouse Box 
Hansen & Hoopes, PLLC 0 Hand Delivery 
428 Park Avenue 0 Facsimile 
P. O. Box 51219 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1219 
Richard J. Armstrong, Esq. • U.S. Mail 
Wood Crapo LLC 0 Overnight Delivery 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 0 Hand Delivery 
60 East South Temple, Suite 500 0 Facsimile 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Marc J. Weinpel, Esq. • U.S. Mail 
1975 Martha A venue 0 Overnight Delivery 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 0 Hand Delivery 
0 Facsimile 
ORDER - 3 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE DONOHUE ) 
O'SHEA, Trustees of the Thomas ) 
and Anne O'Shea Trust u/d/t ) 
DATED NOVEMBER 2, 1998j ) 
GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a ) 
California limited liability ) 
company; CALEB FOOTE, an ) 
individual; KATE LARKIN DONOHUE,) 
an Individual; JOHN KEVIN ) 
DONOHUE, an Individual; and SAN ) 
FRANCISCO RESIDENCE CLUB, INC., ) 
a California corporation, ) MINUTE ENTRY 





HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company;) 
GORDON ARAVE, individually and ) 
as Member of High Mark ) 
Development, LLCi JARED ARAVE, ) 
individually and as Member of ) 
High Mark Development, LLCj ) 
BENJAMIN ARAVE, Individually and) 
as Member of High Mark ) 
Development, LLC, and ) 
JOHN DOES I-X, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
On March 1, 2010, a jury trial convened in open court in 
Centennial Courtroom at Idaho Falls, Idaho, the Honorable Joel E. 
Tingey, District Judge { presiding. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Greg Crockett and Mr. Sean Coletti appeared on behalf of 
the Plaintiffs. Mr. Thomas O'Shea and Ms. Kate Donohue were 
1300 
present at counsel table. 
Mr. Richard Armstrong appeared on behalf of Defendants High 
Mark Development, Gordon Arave, Ben Arave and Jared Arave. Mr. 
Gordon Arave was present at counsel table. 
Prior to court convening, the jury panel viewed a film 
regarding jury service. 
Upon inquiry from the Court, the parties stated they are 
ready to proceed. 
This being the time for the appearance of the jury a roll 
call was taken prior to the start of trial. The following jurors 
were present: Evelyn Butikofer, Emily Howard, Bartell Sargent, 
Margaret Ritchie, Justin Flitton, Wendi Straub, Nicholas 
Christensen, Christopher Nelson, Cindy Pack, Tressi Guajardo, Zane 
Schenk, Paula Wittman, Mason Merrell, Betsy Holmes, James Griffin, 
Joshua Griffieth, Mikelyn Duncan, Glen Riddle, Stacy Lamb, Noelle 
Egbert, Gregory McBride, Maria De Los A Narcizo, Eliza Partridge, 
Melissa Panter, Barbara Croft, Kimberly Stockton, Yesenia 
Hernandez, Jeffrey Moad, Carol Dall, Dianna Russell, Juli Bolley, 
Kyla McBurney-Rebol, Blaine Wilson, Hassen Rockssi, Jason 
McArthur, Morayma Zamora, Rex Shumway, Stefanie Davies, Renee 
Romo, David Roberts, Lettie Stradley-Bass, Elisa Taylor, Monte 
Keppner, Erika Lessing, Misty Velasquez, Jenipher Petersen, 
Barbara Holman, Jamie Scoresby, Andrew Carter, Kendrick Rounds, 
Dustin French and Diane Van Orden. 
The following jurors, being duly summoned, failed to answer 
JURY TRIAL MINUTE ENTRY 2 
1301 
the roll call: Jeuls Scott! Jennifer Beaty! Jessica Crossley! 
Fletcher Howell! Emily Benson! Megan McGuire! and Melynda Hall. 
Prior to the start of trial! 20 prospective jurors were 
seated in the jury seats. 
The Court introduced the court staff! counsel and the 
parties. 
The Court advised the jury panel regarding voir dire and 
challenges for cause. 
Under the direction of the Court! the clerk administered the 
oath of voir dire to the jurors as to their qualifications to 
serve at this term as well as to serve in this cause now pending. 
The Court conducted voir dire examination. 
Mr. Crockett conducted voir dire examination and passed the 
panel for cause. 
Mr. Armstrong conducted voir dire examination and passed the 
panel for cause. 
The Court instructed the jury panel regarding peremptory 
challenges. 
Mr. Crockett exercised 4 peremptory challenges on behalf of 
the State. 
Mr. Armstrong exercised 4 peremptory challenges on behalf of 
the Defendant. 
The Court dismissed those jurors challenged or not called to 
serve in this cause. Upon inquiry from the Court! counsel 
accepted the jury panel as seated. 
JURY TRIAL MINUTE ENTRY 3 
1302 
The following jurors were sworn to well and truly try this 
cause: Emily Howard, Bartell Sargent, Margaret Ritchie, Mikelynn 
Duncan, Glen Riddle, Christopher Nelson, Cindy Pack, Eliza 
Partridge, Paula Wittman, Mason Merrell, Betsy Holmes and Joshua 
Griffith. 
Trial recessed for the evening. Trial will resume at 10:00 
a.m. on Tuesday, March 2, 2010. 
The Court instructed the jury and then directed them to 
follow Marshal Murdock to the jury room. The jury was led from 
the courtroom. 
Court and counsel met (without the presence of the jury) to 
go over schedule of witnesses for tomorrow. 
Trial was in recess. 
On March 2, 2010, a jury trial reconvened at 10:00 a.m. In 
open court in Courtroom III at Idaho Falls, Idaho, the Honorable 
Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, presiding. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Greg Crockett and Mr. Sean Coletti appeared on behalf of 
the Plaintiffs. Mr. Thomas O'Shea and Ms. Kate Donohue were 
present at counsel table. 
Mr. Richard Armstrong appeared on behalf of Defendants High 
Mark Development, Gordon Arave, Ben Arave and Jared Arave. Mr. 
Gordon Arave was present at counsel table. 
JURY TRIAL MINUTE ENTRY 4 
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All witnesses were excluded from the trial. 
A roll call of the jury was taken. All members of the jury 
were present. 
The Court addressed the jury panel and then read preliminary 
instructions nos. 1-13. 
Mr. Crockett presented Plaintiffs' opening statement. 
The Court instructed the jury prior to releasing them for a 
short morning recess. 
Trial resumed at 11:18 a.m. with all parties present. All 
members of the jury were present. 
Mr. Armstrong presented Defendants' opening statement. 
The Court instructed the jury prior to releasing them for 
lunch break. Trial will resume at 1:05 p.m. 
On March 2, 2010, a jury trial reconvened at 1:05 p.m. in 
open court in Courtroom III at Idaho Falls, Idaho, the Honorable 
Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, presiding. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Greg Crockett and Mr. Sean Coletti appeared on behalf of 
the Plaintiffs. Mr. Thomas O'Shea and Ms. Kate Donohue were 
present at counsel table. 
Mr. Richard Armstrong appeared on behalf of Defendants High 
Mark Development, Gordon Arave, Ben Arave and Jared Arave. Mr. 
Gordon Arave was present at counsel table. 
JURY TRIAL MINUTE ENTRY 5 
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All members of the jury were present. 
Mr. Thomas O'Shea was called as a witness on behalf of the 
Plaintiffs. Mr. O'Shea was placed under oath and took the witness 
stand. Mr. Crockett inquired of Mr. OtShea. Plaintiff's Exhibit 
4 - loop net ad - was marked, offered and admitted. Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 8 - lease agreement - was marked t offered and admitted. 
Plaintifft s Exhibit 6 - Idaho Childrents Center Website screen -
was marked, offered and admitted. Plaintiff's Exhibit 7 - email 
correspondence w/Fife to Needs - was marked, offered and admitted. 
Plaintiffts Exhibit 5 - Purchase and Sale Agreement - was marked t 
offered t objection raised t objection overruled and the exhibit was 
admitted. Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 - email correspondence w/Fife to 
Needs was marked t offered and admitted without objection. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 16 - Childrents Center tax returns - was 
marked, offered, with objection raised. Mr. Crockett inquired 
further. Mr. Crockett offered a modified Exhibit 16 - it was 
offered and admitted as modified. Plaintifft s Exhibit 14 - Fife 
fax to Needs - was marked t offered and admitted. Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 25 - lease estoppel certificate - was marked, offered and 
admitted. 
A side bar was requested. The Court instructed the jury 
prior to releasing them for a recess. The jury was led from the 
courtroom. 
Mr. Armstrong advised that remedial measures are not 
admissible. Mr. Crockett advised that at this time it was a 
JURY TRIAL MINUTE ENTRY 6 
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mitigation effort. Mr. Armstrong presented a further objection as 
to relevance. The Court will make a ruling on a question by 
question basis. 
Trial resumed at 2:39 p.m. with all parties present. All 
members of the jury were present. 
Mr. Crockett advised the Court that the parties stipulated to 
the admission of Plaintiff's Exhibit 32 - settlement statement -
and Defendant's Exhibit I - HUD settlement statement. 
Mr. Thomas O'Shea retook the witness stand subject to direct 
examination by Mr. Crockett. plaintiff's Exhibit 54 - lease 
agreement between O'Shea and Family Care Center - was marked, 
offered and admitted. plaintiff's Exhibit 55 - second amendment 
to lease with FCC - was marked, offered and admitted. 
Mr. Armstrong cross-examined Mr. O'Shea. Defendant's 
Exhibits UUU - 11/15/07 Tenancy in Common Agreement - was marked, 
offered and admitted. Defendant's Exhibit xx - Complaint for 
Damages - was marked, offered, objection raised and objection 
sustained by the Court. Defendant's Exhibit M (part of 16) - was 
admitted by stipulation. The deposition of Tom O'Shea was 
published and presented to the witness. Defendant's Exhibit N -
balance sheet - was marked, offered and admitted. 
The Court instructed the jury prior to releasing them for an 
afternoon break. The jury was led from the courtroom. 
Trial resumed at 4:15 p.m. with all parties present. All 
members of the jury were present. 
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Mr. O'Shea retook the witness stand subject to cross-
examination by Mr. Armstrong. Defendant's Exhibit II - letter 
from Needs to Fife - was marked, offered and admitted. 
Defendant's Exhibit GGG - O'Shea responses to interrogatories -
was marked, offered and admitted. Defendant's Exhibit AA -
9/21/07 fax from Needs to Fife - was marked, offered and admitted. 
Defendant's Exhibit CCCC - 9/17/07 email from O'Shea to Needs -
was marked, offered and admitted. 
The Court instructed the jury prior to releasing them for the 
evening. Trial will continue at 10:00 a.m. on Wednesday, March 3, 
2010. 
On March 3, 2010, a jury trial reconvened at 10:00 a.m. In 
open court in Courtroom III at Idaho Falls, Idaho, the Honorable 
Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, presiding. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Greg Crockett and Mr. Sean Coletti appeared on behalf of 
the Plaintiffs. Mr. Thomas O'Shea and Ms. Kate Donohue were 
present at counsel table. 
Mr. Richard Armstrong appeared on behalf of Defendants High 
Mark Development, Gordon Arave, Ben Arave and Jared Arave. Mr. 
Gordon Arave was present at counsel table. 
All members of the jury were present. Roll call of the jury 
was waived. 
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The parties stipulated to take a witness out of order. 
Mr. Brent Butikofer was called and placed under oath by the 
clerk. Mr. Coletti inquired of Mr. Butikofer on direct 
examination. Defendant's Exhibit TT - Exclusive Leasing Listing 
Agreement - was admitted by stipulation of the parties. 
Plaintiff l s Exhibit 58 - financi.al analysis for FCC - was marked, 
offered and admitted. Mr. Armstrong cross-examined Mr. Butikofer. 
The deposition of Brent Butikofer was published and presented to 
the witness. Defendant's Exhibit DDDD - 7/07/08 email from 
Butikofer to Needs - was marked, offered and admitted. Mr. 
Coletti inquired on redirect examination. The witness was excused 
from the witness stand. 
The Court instructed the jury prior to conducting a morning 
break. The jury was led from the courtroom. 
Trial continued at 11:27 a.m. with all parties present. All 
members of the jury were present. 
Mr. Thomas O'Shea retook the witness stand subject to 
continued cross-examination by Mr. Armstrong. Defendant's Exhibit 
PP - 11/26/07 fax cover sheet and attached "Updated CAM Charges ll -
was marked, offered and admitted. Defendant's Exhibit A -
Plaintiff's Complaint - was marked, offered, objection raised, 
objection sustained and denied admission at this time. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 35 - Notice to Pay Rent or Quit - was admitted 
by stipulation of the parties. Plaintiff's Exhibit 36 - Weinpel 
letter to Needs advising Children's Center will vacate - was 
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admitted by stipulation of the parties. Defendant's Exhibit www -
10/24/07 email Needs to O'Shea - was admitted by stipulation of 
the parties. Defendant's Exhibit XXX - Farm Bureau Businessowners 
coverage sheet - was marked, offered and admitted. Defendant's 
Exhibit zzz - 9/14/07 email from O'Shea to Shiffman & Needs - was 
marked, offered and admitted. Defendant's Exhibit BBBB - 9/28/07 
email from O'Shea to Shiffman & Needs - was marked, offered and 
admitted. 
Mr. Crockett inquired of Mr. O'Shea on redirect examination. 
The Court instructed the jury prior to releasing them for 
lunch break. Trial will continued at 1:15 p.m. 
On March 3, 2010, a jury trial reconvened at 1:15 p.m. In 
open court in Courtroom III at Idaho Falls, Idaho, the Honorable 
Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, presiding. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Greg Crockett and Mr. Sean Coletti appeared on behalf of 
the Plaintiffs. Mr. Thomas O'Shea and Ms. Kate Donohue were 
present at counsel table. 
Mr. Richard Armstrong appeared on behalf of Defendants High 
Mark Development, Gordon Arave, Ben Arave and Jared Arave. Mr. 
Gordon Arave was present at counsel table. 
All members of the jury were present. Roll call of the jury 
was waived. 
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Mr. Thomas O'Shea retook the witness stand subject to 
redirect examination by Mr. Crockett. Defendant's Exhibit Z -
9/20/07 - Lease estoppel certificate - was admitted by stipulation 
of the parties. Mr. Armstrong inquired on recross-examination. 
Defendant's Exhibit CC - 9/28/07 letter from Armstrong to Fife 
w/9/27/07 estoppel certificate - was admitted by stipulation of 
the parties. Mr. Crocket inquired further. Mr. O'Shea was 
excused from the witness stand. 
Ms. Nikki Maguire was called as a witness on behalf of the 
Plaintiff. She was placed under oath and took the witness stand. 
Mr. Sean Coletti inquired on direct examination. Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 39 - check and financial transaction records for 
Children's Center 2005-2007 - was marked, offered and the first 
page only was admitted. Mr. Armstrong inquired on cross-
examination. Ms. Maguire was excused from the witness stand. 
Mr. Jeff Needs was called on behalf of the Plaintiff. He was 
placed under oath by the clerk and took the witness stand. Mr. 
Crockett inquired on direct examination. 
The Court instructed the jury prior to releasing them for an 
afternoon break. The jury was led from the courtroom. 
Trial resumed at 2:30 p.m. with all parties present. All 
members of the jury were present. 
Mr. Greg Crockett continued direct examination of Mr. Jeff 
Needs. Plaintiff's Exhibit 20 - Arave Const. fax to Fife 9/18/07 
- was marked, offered and admitted. Plaintiff's Exhibit 17 -
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Needs financial analysis of Children's Center cash flow - was 
marked, offered and admitted. Plaintiff's Exhibit 52 - fax to 
Needs from Fife stating deficit balance - was admitted (and was 
also admitted as Exhibit PP) . 
The Court instructed the jury prior to releasing them for an 
afternoon break. The jury was led from the courtroom. 
Trial continued at 3:54 p.m. with all parties present. 
Mr. Jeff Needs retook the witness stand subject to cross-
examination by Mr. Armstrong. The deposition of Jeff Needs was 
published and presented to the witness. 
A side bar was requested. The Court instructed the jury. 
They were led from the courtroom. The jury was not present. 
The question of due diligence was discussed. 
During the side bar, the Court received a note that one of 
the jurors' daughters is on the way to the emergency room for 
anaphylactic shock. The Court released the jurors for the evening 
with the instruction to return tomorrow at 9:30 a.m. 
Mr. Crockett addressed the Court. Mr. Armstrong argued in 
support of due diligence. The objection was made and sustained by 
the Court. 
Trial was in recess for the evening. Trial will continued at 
9:30 a.m. on Thursday, March 4, 2010. 
On March 4, 2010, jury trial reconvened at 9:30 a.m. in open 
court in Courtroom III at Idaho Falls, Idaho, the Honorable Joel 
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E. Tingey, District Judge, presiding. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Greg Crockett and Mr. Sean Coletti appeared on behalf of 
the Plaintiffs. Mr. Thomas O'Shea and Ms. Kate Donohue were 
present at counsel table. 
Mr. Richard Armstrong appeared on behalf of Defendants High 
Mark Development, Gordon Arave, Ben Arave and Jared Arave. Mr. 
Gordon Arave was present at counsel table. 
All members of the jury were present. 
Mr. Jeff Needs retook the witness stand. He was still under 
oath. Mr. Armstrong cross-examined Mr. Needs. Defendant's 
Exhibit BB - 9/24/07 Lease Estoppel Certificate draft - was 
marked, offered and admitted. Defendant's Exhibit DD - 10/02/07 
letter from Needs to Fife - was marked, offered and admitted. 
Defendant's Exhibit FF - 10/03/07 email from Fife to Needs - was 
marked, offered and admitted. Mr. Crocket inquired on redirect 
examination. Defendant's Exhibit X - Children's Center Financial 
Summary prepared by Needs - was marked t offered, objection raised, 
objection overruled and admitted into evidence. Defendant's 
Exhibit J - Buyers Contribution to Purchase Price Sheet - was 
marked, offered and admitted. Mr. Needs was excused from the 
witness stand. 
The Court instructed the jury prior to conducting a morning 
break. The jury was led from the courtroom. 
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Trial resumed at 10:56 a.m. with all parties present. 
Mr. Paul Fife was called as a witness. The deposition of 
Paul Fife was published and read into the record by Mr. Ted Larsen 
(an associate of Mr. Crockett). Mr. Fife was sworn at the time of 
his deposition. Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 (same as 1 in Fife's 
deposition) RE-10 Exclusive Seller Representation Agreement - was 
marked, offered and admitted. Defendant's Exhibit T - 8/28/07 
letter from Armstrong to Fife - was marked, offered and admitted. 
Reading of the deposition was completed. 
The jury was instructed prior to releasing them for lunch 
break. Trial will continue at 1:20 p.m. 
On March 4, 2010, jury trial reconvened at 1:22 p.m. in open 
court in Courtroom III at Idaho Falls, Idaho, the Honorable Joel 
E. Tingey, District Judge, presiding. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Greg Crockett and Mr. Sean Coletti appeared on behalf of 
the Plaintiffs. Mr. Thomas O'Shea and Ms. Kate Donohue were 
present at counsel table. 
Mr. Richard Armstrong appeared on behalf of Defendants High 
Mark Development, Gordon Arave, Ben Arave and Jared Arave. Mr. 
Gordon Arave was present at counsel table. 
All members of the jury were present. 
Mr. Marc Weinpel was called as a witness on behalf of the 
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Plaintiffs. Mr. Weinpel was sworn and took the witness stand. 
Mr. Crockett inquired of Mr. Weinpel on direct examination. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 13 - email between Armstrong and Weinpel 
8/27/07 - was marked, offered and admitted. Plaintiff's Exhibit 
18 - email between Armstrong and Weinpel 9/17/07 - was marked, 
offered and admitted. Plaintiff's Exhibit 19 - Armstrong fax to 
Weinpel re: leases 9/18/07 - was marked, offered and admitted. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 21 - email from Armstrong to Weinpel 9/20/07 -
was marked, offered and admitted. Plaintiff's Exhibit 22 - Arave 
Construction fax/letter from Williams - was marked, offered and 
admitted. Plaintiff's Exhibit 38 - Williams fax to Children's 
Center - was marked, offered and admitted. Plaintiff's Exhibit 23 
- memo to Williams from Weinpel unable to pay - was marked, 
offered and admitted. Plaintiff's Exhibit 50 - fax letter from 
Weinpel to Armstrong offer to relinquish option to purchase - was 
marked, offered and admitted. Plaintiff's Exhibit 51 - letter 
from Armstrong to Weinpel re: estoppel certificate - was marked, 
offered and admitted. Plaintiff's Exhibit 24 - Agreement signed 
by Arave 10/18/07 - was marked, offered and admitted. Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 27 - email between Armstrong and Weinpel 10/24/07 - was 
marked, offered and admitted. Plaintiff's Exhibit 28 - email from 
Armstrong to Weinpel - was marked, offered and admitted. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 29 - email to Weinpel re: rent obligation -
was marked, offered and admitted. Plaintiff's Exhibit 31 - email 
from Armstrong to Weinpel - was marked, offered and admitted. 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 33 - email from Armstrong to Weinpel 12/12/07 
- was marked, offered and admitted. Plaintiff's Exhibit 34 -
email Weinpel to Armstrong re: financial setback - was marked, 
offered and admitted. Plaintiff's Exhibit 40 - letter to Weinpel 
from Armstrong 12/12/07 - was marked, offered and admitted. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 56 - letter to Weinpel from Armstrong re: sale 
of IF building to O'Shea 12/12/07 - was withdrawn. Defendant's 
Exhibit NNN - 10/04/07 email from Armstrong to Weinpel re: lease 
estoppel certificate - was marked, offered and admitted. 
The Court instructed the jury prior to conducting an 
afternoon break. The jury was led from the courtroom. 
Trial continued at 3:05 p.m. with all parties present. 
Mr. Marc Weinpel retook the witness stand subject to cross-
examination by Mr. Armstrong. Mr. Crockett inquired on redirect 
examination. Mr. Weinpel was excused from the witness stand. 
Mr. Matt Smith was called as a witness on behalf of the 
Plaintiffs. Mr. Smith was placed under oath and took the witness 
stand. Mr. Coletti inquired of Mr. Smith on direct examination. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 10 admitted as exhibit 40. Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 9 - Arave Construction fax to Children's Center 1/26/07 -
was marked, offered, objection raised, objection sustained. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 12 - Promissory Note payable to Arave - was 
marked, offered and admitted. Plaintiff's Exhibit RRR - 10/05/07 
building lease APM - was marked, offered, objection raised, 
objection sustained. Mr. Coletti reoffered Exhibit RRR. Mr. 
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Armstrong objected. The Court overruled the objection and 
admitted Exhibit RRR. 
The Court instructed the jury prior to releasing them for the 
evening. Trial will resume at 9:00 a.m. on Friday, March 5, 2010. 
Trial was in recess for the evening. 
On March 5, 2010, jury trial reconvened at 9:03 a.m. in open 
court in Courtroom III at Idaho Falls, Idaho, the Honorable Joel 
E. Tingey, District Judge, presiding. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Greg Crockett and Mr. Sean Coletti appeared on behalf of 
the Plaintiffs. Mr. Thomas O'Shea and Ms. Kate Donohue were 
present at counsel table. 
Mr. Richard Armstrong appeared on behalf of Defendants High 
Mark Development, Gordon Arave, Ben Arave and Jared Arave. Mr. 
Gordon Arave was present at counsel table. 
All members of the jury were present. 
Mr. Matt Smith retook the witness stand. Mr. Smith was still 
under oath. Mr. Armstrong inquired on cross-examination. 
Defendant's Exhibit sss - Children's Center corporate minutes 
2/07/08 - was marked, offered, objection raised, objection 
overruled and SSS was admitted into evidence. Mr. Armstrong 
inquired on redirect examination. Mr. Smith was excused from the 
witness stand subject to recall by Mr. Armstrong. 
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Mr. David Smith was called by the Plaintiffs. He was placed 
under oath by the clerk and took the witness stand. Mr. Crockett 
inquired on direct examination. Plaintiff's Exhibit 47 (pages 7-
10 only) - David Smith expert witness report - was marked, 
offered, objection raised, and Exhibit 47 pages 7 through 10 only 
was admitted as modified. Plaintiff's Exhibit 48 - David Smith's 
curriculum vitae - was marked, offered and admitted. Mr. 
Armstrong cross-examined David Smith. Plaintiff's Exhibit 49 
(pages 317 through 321 only) - David Smith exhibits to expert 
witness report - was admitted as modified. Mr. Crockett inquired 
on redirect examination. Mr. Smith was excused from the witness 
stand. 
The Court instructed the jury prior to releasing them for a 
morning recess. The jury was led from the courtroom. 
Trial resumed at 10:19 a.m. with all parties present. 
Mrs. Kate Donohue was called on behalf of the Plaintiffs. 
She was placed under oath and took the witness stand. Mr. 
Crockett inquired on direct examination. Mr. Armstrong cross-
examined Mrs. Donohue. Mrs. Donohue was excused from the witness 
stand. 
Mr. Kevin Donohue was called on behalf of the Plaintiffs, 
placed under oath, and took the witness stand. Mr. Crockett 
inquired on direct examination. Mr. Armstrong cross-examined the 
witness. The deposition of Kevin Donohue was published and 
presented to the witness. Mr. Donohue was excused from the 
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witness stand. 
Mr. Jack Chillemi was called on behalf of the Plaintiffs. He 
was placed under oath by the clerk and took the witness stand. 
Mr. Crockett inquired of Mr. Chillemi. Mr. Armstrong cross-
examined. The deposition of Jack Chillemi was published and 
presented to the witness. Mr. Crockett inquired on redirect 
examination. The witness was excused from the witness stand. 
Mr. Jared Arave was called by the Plaintiffs, placed under 
oath and took the witness stand. Mr. Crockett inquired on direct 
examination. Mr. Armstrong cross-examined Mr. Arave. Mr. Arave 
was excused from the witness stand. 
The Court instructed the jury prior to releasing them for 
lunch break. Trial will continue at 1:15 p.m. 
On March 5, 2010, jury trial reconvened at 1:15 p.m. in open 
court in Courtroom III at Idaho Falls, Idaho, the Honorable Joel 
E. Tingey, District Judge, presiding. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Greg Crockett and Mr. Sean Coletti appeared on behalf of 
the Plaintiffs. Mr. Thomas O'Shea and Ms. Kate Donohue were 
present at counsel table. 
Mr. Richard Armstrong appeared on behalf of Defendants High 
Mark Development, Gordon Arave, Ben Arave and Jared Arave. Mr. 
Gordon Arave was present at counsel table. 
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The jury was not present. 
Mr. Crockett moved the Court to use all available trial time 
today. Mr. Armstrong responded. 
Mr. Armstrong presented an offer of proof regarding Ann 
O'Shea's deposition testimony. Mr. Crockett presented argument In 
opposition to the offer. Mr. Armstrong presented rebuttal 
argument. Further argument was heard. The Court will exclude 
that portion. 
The jury was brought into the courtroom. All members of the 
jury were present. 
Mr. Gordon Arave was called by the Plaintiffs, placed under 
oath and took the witness stand. Mr. Crockett inquired of Mr. 
Arave. The deposition of Gordon Arave was published and presented 
to the witness. Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 - Amendment to Operating 
Agreement of High Mark Development 6/23/06 - was marked, offered 
and admitted. Plaintiff's Exhibit 9 - Arave Const. Fax to 
Children's Center - was marked, offered and admitted. Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 15 - Arave fax letter to Matt Smith 4/18/07 - was marked, 
offered and admitted. Plaintiff's Exhibit 53 - letter to Matt 
Smith from Arave - was marked, offered and admitted. Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 57 - chart showing amounts due on both buildings - was 
marked, offered and admitted. 
The Court instructed the jury prior to conducting an 
afternoon recess. The jury was led from the courtroom. 
Trial continued at 2:55 p.m. with all parties present. All 
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members of the jury were present. 
Mr. Gordon Arave retook the witness stand subject to cross-
examination by Mr. Armstrong. Mr. Crockett inquired on redirect 
examination. Mr. Arave was excused from the witness stand. 
The deposition of Caleb Foote was published. Caleb Foote was 
placed under oath at the time of the deposition. Mr. Jared Arave 
read Caleb Foote's answers in the deposition. 
The Court instructed the jury prior to releasing them for the 
evening. Trial will resume at 10:00 a.m. on Tuesday, March 9, 
2010. 
Court was in recess for the evening. 
On March 9, 2010, jury trial reconvened at 10:00 a.m. in 
open court in Courtroom III at Idaho Falls, Idaho, the Honorable 
Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, presiding. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Greg Crockett and Mr. Sean Coletti appeared on behalf of 
the Plaintiffs. Mr. Thomas O'Shea and Ms. Kate Donohue were 
present at counsel table. 
Mr. Richard Armstrong appeared on behalf of Defendants High 
Mark Development, Gordon Arave, Ben Arave and Jared Arave. Mr. 
Gordon Arave was present at counsel table. 
The jury was not present. 
Court and counsel had a discussion with juror Mikelynn Duncan 
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off the record in chambers. It was determined that there is 
reason to disqualify her as a juror. 
Mr. Crockett presented a motion in limine re: Louis Kramel 
and his late disclosure as a witness. Mr. Armstrong presented 
argument in opposition to the motion in limine. The Court will 
allow Mr. Kramel's to testify but will limit the testimony. 
The jury was brought into the courtroom. All members of the 
jury were present. 
Mr. Ben Arave was called as a witness by the Plaintiffs. Mr. 
Arave was placed under oath by the clerk and took the witness 
stand. Mr. Crockett cross examined Mr. Arave. Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 30 - Consent to Transfer and Assumption - was marked, 
offered, objection raised, objection overruled, and admitted into 
evidence. Plaintiff's Exhibit 41 - warranty deed - was marked, 
offered and admitted. Plaintiff's Exhibit 43 - loan assumption 
letter signed by Ben Arave - was marked, offered, objection 
raised, objection overruled, and admitted. Plaintiff's Exhibit 44 
- High Mark Dev rent roll signed by Ben Arave - was marked, 
offered, objection raised, objection overruled and admitted into 
evidence. Plaintiff's Exhibit 59 - email from Ben Arave to 
Gottschall - was marked, offered, objection raised, objection 
overruled and admitted. Plaintiff's Exhibit 60 - fax from Arave 
to Gottschall - was marked, offered, objection raised, objection 
sustained and denied. Plaintiff's Exhibit 45 - Standard Insurance 
Company from High Mark - was marked, offered, objection raised, 
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objection overruled, and admitted. 
Mr. Armstrong inquired of Ben Arave on cross-examination. 
Mr. Arave was excused from the witness stand. 
Plaintiffs rested. 
Mr. Louis Kraml was called by the Defendants. He was placed 
under oath and took the witness stand. Mr. Armstrong inquired of 
the witness on direct examination. The witness was excused. 
Mr. Layne Van Orden was called on behalf of the Defendants. 
He was placed under oath and took the stand. Mr. Armstrong 
inquired of Mr. Van Orden on direct examination. 
The Court instructed the jury prior to conducting a morning 
recess. The jury was led from the courtroom. 
Mr. Armstrong presented argument in support of evidence of 
the character of Mr. Arave. Mr. Crockett argued in opposition to 
the motion. Mr. Armstrong presented rebuttal argument. The Court 
will take the matter under advisement and let counsel know prior 
to the start of trial. 
The jury was not present. 
The Court made its ruling regarding character evidence and 
will not allow evidence as to character. 
Trial resumed at 11:25 a.m. The jury was brought into the 
courtroom. All members of the jury were present. 
Mr. Layne Van Orden retook the witness stand subject to 
direct examination by Mr. Armstrong. Mr. Coletti cross-examined 
Mr. Van Orden. The deposition of Layne Van Orden was published 
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and presented to the witness. Mr. Armstrong inquired on redirect 
examination. Mr. Van Orden was excused from the witness stand. 
Mr. Jared Arave was recalled as a witness. Mr. Arave was 
still under oath. Mr. Arave took the witness stand. Mr. 
Armstrong inquired on direct examination. Mr. Crockett cross-
examined. Mr. Armstrong inquired on redirect examination. Mr. 
Arave was excused from the witness stand. 
Mr. Ben Arave was recalled to the witness stand. Mr. Arave 
was still under oath. Mr. Arave retook the witness stand subject 
to direct examination by Mr. Armstrong. Mr. Crockett cross-
examined Mr. Arave. Mr. Armstrong inquired on redirect 
examination. Mr. Arave was excused from the witness stand. 
The Court instructed the jury prior to releasing them for 
lunch break. Trial will resume at 1:15 p.m. 
On March 9, 2010, jury trial reconvened at 1:18 p.m. in open 
court in Courtroom III at Idaho Falls, Idaho, the Honorable Joel 
E. Tingey, District Judge, presiding. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Greg Crockett and Mr. Sean Coletti appeared on behalf of 
the Plaintiffs. Mr. Thomas O'Shea and Ms. Kate Donohue were 
present at counsel table. 
Mr. Richard Armstrong appeared on behalf of Defendants High 
Mark Development, Gordon Arave, Ben Arave and Jared Arave. Mr. 
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Gordon Arave was present at counsel table. 
The jury was present. 
Mr. Gordon Arave was recalled on behalf of the Defendants. 
Mr. Arave was already under oath. Mr. Armstrong inquired on 
direct examination. 
The Court instructed the jury prior to releasing them for an 
afternoon recess. The jury was led from the courtroom. 
Trial resumed at 3:05 p.m. with all parties present. 
Mr. Gordon Arave retook the witness stand subject to cross-
examination by Mr. Crockett. Mr. Armstrong inquired on redirect. 
Mr. Arave was excused from the witness stand. 
Defendants rested. 
The Court instructed the jury prior to conducting an 
afternoon recess. The jury was led from the courtroom. 
The Court conducted an informal jury instruction conference 
off the record in chambers. 
Court and counsel then moved back to the courtroom to put 
motions and jury instruction conference on the record. 
Mr. Crockett waived rebuttal testimony. 
Mr. Armstrong presented an oral motion for directed verdict. 
Mr. Crockett addressed the Court in opposition to the motion for 
directed verdict. Mr. Armstrong presented rebuttal argument. 
The Court granted the directed verdict as to Jared Arave. 
The Court then moved to the jury instruction conference. 
The Court noted the Court's proposed instructions were 
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provided to counsel earlier and, upon inquiry from the Court, 
counsel stated they have had an opportunity to review the proposed 
instructions. 
Mr. Coletti advised the Court regarding Plaintiffs' objection 
to the jury instructions, modification or instructions submitted. 
Mr. Armstrong presented Defendants' objections to the jury 
instructions and requested modifications or instructions 
submitted. 
The Court will give the instructions as they are or have 
already been modified. 
Jury instruction conference recessed. 
The Court went back on the record and advised that #23 will 
be modified. 
Jury instruction conference recessed. 
Trial continued at 5:25 p.m. with all parties present. All 
members of the jury were present. 
The Court read the final jury instructions. 
Mr. Crockett presented Plaintiff's closing argument. 
The Court instructed the jury prior to conducting a short 
recess. The jury was led from the courtroom. 
Trial resumed at 6:38 p.m. with all parties present. All 
members of the jury were present. 
Mr. Armstrong presented Defendant's closing argument. 
Mr. Crockett presented rebuttal argument. 
Under the direction of the Court, the Bailiff was 
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administered the oath by the Clerk. 
The jury retired at 7:50 p.m. for deliberation in the charge 
of the Bailiff. 
Court recessed at 7:50 p.m. 
Court reconvened on March 10, 2010 at 12:05 p.m. in open 
court. Counsel waived roll call of the jury. 
Upon being asked by the Court, the Betsy Holmes, jury 
foreman, stated they had arrived at a verdict and handed the 
verdict to the Bailiff who delivered it to the Court. Under the 
direction of the Court, the clerk read and filed the verdict as 
follows: 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE DONOHUE 
O'SHEA, Trustees of the Thomas 
and Anne O'Shea Trust u/d/t 
DATED NOVEMBER 2, 1998; 
GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a 
California limited liability 
company; CALEB FOOTE, an 
individual; KATE LARKIN DONOHUE, 
an Individual; JOHN KEVIN 
DONOHUE, an Individual; and SAN 
FRANCISCO RESIDENCE CLUB, INC., 
a California corporation, 
plaintiffs, 
vs. 
HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company; 
GORDON ARAVE, individually and 
as Member of High Mark 
Development, LLC; JARED ARAVE, 
individually and as Member of 
High Mark Development, LLC; 
BENJAMIN ARAVE, Individually and 
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as Member of High Mark 
Development, LLC, and 
JOHN DOES I-X, 
Defendants. 
We, the jury answer the interrogatories in the Verdict Form as follows: 
Question No.1. Did High Mark Development LLC's breach of the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing and breach of contract as to the Purchase 
Agreement and estoppel certificate proximately cause damages to Plaintiffs? 
Answer: Yes No x 
Question No.2: Did High Mark Development commit fraud, which was a 
proximate cause of damages to Plaintiffs? 
Answer: Yes No x 
Question No.3: Did High Mark Development commit fraud by 
nondisclosure, which was a proximate cause of damages to plaintiffs? 
Answer: Yes No x 
If you answered "no" to questions 1 through 3, proceed to question 5. If you 
answered "yes" to any of the questions 1 through 3, proceed to Question No.4. 
Question No.4. What is the total amount of damages sustained by 
Plaintiffs on the foregoing claim{s)? 
Question No.5: Did Gordon Arave commit fraud, which was a proximate 
cause of damages to Plaintiffs? 
Answer: Yes No x 
Question No.6: Did Gordon Arave commit fraud by nondisclosure, which 
was a proximate cause of damages to Plaintiffs? 
Answer: Yes No x 
If you answered "no" to questions 5 and 6, proceed to question 8. If you 
answered "yes" to questions 5 and/or 6, proceed to Question No.7. 
Question No.7. What is the total amount of damages sustained by 
Plaintiffs on the foregoing claim{s) against Gordon Arave? 
JURY TRIAL MINUTE ENTRY 28 
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Question No.8: Did Benjamin Arave commit fraud by nondisclosure? 
Answer: Yes No x 
If you answered "no" to question 8, sign the verdict form and notify the 
bailiff. If you answered "yes" to questions 8, proceed to Question NO.9. 
Question No.9. What is the total amount of damages sustained by 
Plaintiff on the foregoing claim against Benjamin Arave? 
Dated this lOth day of March, 2010. 
/s/ Betsy Holmes (Foreman) 
/s/ Mikelyn Duncan 
/s/ Eliza Partridge 
/s/ Bart Sargent 
/s/ Josh Griffith 
/s/ Mason Merrell 
/s/ Margaret Ritchie 
/s/ cindy J. Pack 
/s/ Emily Howard 
Upon inquiry from the Court, the jury panel stated that this 
was in fact their verdict. 
The Court read a final jury instruction and thanked and 
excused the jurors at 12:12 p.m. 
Court was thus adjourned at 12:12 p.m. 
JURY TRIAL MINUTE ENTRY 29 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of March, 2010, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to 
be delivered to the following: 
Gregory L. Crockett 
Sean J. Coletti 
PO Box 51219 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1219 
(Plaintiffs) 
Richard J. Armstrong 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 E. South Temple, Ste. 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Deputy Court Clerk 
(High Mark Development, Gordon Arave, Ben Arave and Jared Arave) 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO.1 
Now that you have been selected and sworn as the jury to try this case, I want to go over 
with you what will be happening. To start the trial, I will read to you some of the instructions as 
to the law that applies in this case. The attorney for the plaintiff or plaintiffs will make an 
opening statement, and then the attorney for the defendant or defendants may make an opening 
statement. The attorney for the defendant or defendants may save his opening statement until 
later. The opening statement is intended to inform you about the party's case, and what is 
claimed by a party, and what evidence the party intends to produce for you. However, the 
opening statement is not evidence. 
After the opening statements, each party offers evidence to support their respective 
claims. The plaintiff or plaintiffs proceed first and offer all of their evidence in support of their 
claims. Then the defendant or defendants proceed to offer all of their evidence in support of their 
defenses. Thereafter, the plaintiff or plaintiffs may, but are not required to, offer evidence to 
rebut the evidence presented by the defendant or defendants. 
After all of the evidence has been presented, I will read to you the rest of your 
instructions. In those instructions I will tell you what the law is and will tell you what you will 
have to decide. 
Then the trial concludes with the closing arguments of the attorneys for both sides. 
Finally, you will be taken to the jury room where you can deliberate on your verdict in privacy. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.2 
These instructions define your duties as members of the jury and the law that applies to 
this case. 
Your duties are to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these instructions to 
those facts, and in this way to decide the case. In so doing, you must follow these instructions. 
You must consider them as a whole, not picking out one and disregarding others. Neither 
sympathy nor prejudice should influence you in your deliberations. Faithful performance by you 
of these duties is vital to the administration of justice. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This 
evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits offered and received, and any 
stipulated or admitted facts. As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine which of the 
witnesses you believe, what portion of their testimony you accept, and what weight you attach to 
it. 
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during the trial, 
I may sustain an objection to a question without permitting the witness to answer it or to an 
offered exhibit without receiving it into evidence. I will do this when the question calls for 
testimony that was not admissible or when the exhibit itself was inadmissible. In reaching your 
decision, you may not consider such a question or exhibit or speculate as to what the answer or 
exhibit would have shown. In addition, where an answer is given or an exhibit received, I may 
instruct that it be stricken from the record, that you disregard it and that you dismiss it from your 
minds. I will do this when it becomes apparent that the evidence was inadmissible only after it 
had been presented to you. In reaching your decision, you may not consider this testimony or 
exhibit. Except as explained in this instruction, none of my rulings are intended by me to 
indicate any opinion concerning the evidence in this case. 
The arguments and remarks of the attorneys involved in this case are intended to help you 
in understanding the evidence and applying the instructions, but they are not themselves 
evidence. If any argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, then you should disregard it. 
However, there are two exceptions to this rule: (1) an admission of fact by one attorney is 
binding on his party; and (2) stipulations of fact by all attorneys are binding on all parties. 
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course of the 
trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what 
weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this courtroom all of the experience 
and background of your lives. In your everyday affairs, you determine for yourselves whom you 
believe, what you believe and how much weight you attach to what you are told. The same 
considerations that you use in your everyday dealings in making these decisions are the 
considerations which you should apply in your deliberations. 
In evaluating the testimony, you should consider such items as: the interest, bias or 
prejudice of any witness in the outcome of this case; the age and appearance of the witness and 
the manner in which the witness gives his or her testimony; the opportunity that the witness had 
to observe the facts about which he or she testified; the contradiction, if any, of a witness's 
testimony by other evidence; any statements made by the witness at other times that are 
inconsistent with his or her present testimony; any evidence regarding a witness's general 
reputation for truth, honesty or integrity; and any felony conviction of a witness. 
In evaluating the exhibits, you should consider such items as: the circumstances under 
which the exhibit was prepared; and the probability that the exhibit accurately reflects what it is 
intended to show in light of the other evidence of the case. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.3 
If during the trial I may say or do anything which suggests to you that I am inclined to 
favor the claims or position of any party, you will not permit yourself to be influenced by any 
such suggestion. I will not express nor intend to express, nor will I intend to intimate, any 
opinion as to which witnesses are or are not worthy of belief; what facts are or are not 
established; or what inferences should be drawn from the evidence. If any expression of mine 
seems to indicate an opinion relating to any of these matters, I instruct you to disregard it. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.4 
If you wish, you may take notes to help you remember what witnesses said. If you do 
take notes, please keep them to yourself until you and your fellow jurors go to the jury room to 
decide the case. You should not let note-taking distract you so that you do not hear other 
answers by witnesses. When you leave at night, please leave your notes in the jury room. 
If you do not take notes, you should rely on your own memory of what was said and not be 
overly influenced by the notes of other jurors. In addition, you cannot assign to one person the 
duty of taking notes for all of you. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give his or her opinion 
on that matter. In determining the weight to be given such opinion, you should consider the 
qualifications and credibility of the witness and the reasons given for his or her opinion. You are 
not bound by such opinion. Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem it entitled. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 5' 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is evidence that directly 
proves one of the facts on which a party has the burden of proof in the case, without resorting to 
inference. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves one of the facts on which a 
paIiy has the burden of proof in the case, by means of proving one or more facts from which the 
fact at issue may be inferred. 
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as to the degree 
of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is respected for 
such convincing force as it may carry. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
From time to time during the trial it may become necessary for me to talk with the 
attorneys out of the hearing of the jury, either by having a conference at this bench when the jury 
is present in the courtroom, or by calling a recess. Please understand that while you are waiting, 
we are working. The purpose of these conferences is not to keep relevant information from you, 
but to decide how certain evidence is to be treated under the rules of evidence and to avoid 
confusion and error. 
We will, of course, do what we can to keep the number and length of these conferences to 
a minimum. I may not always grant an attorney's request for a conference. Do not consider my 
granting or denying a request for a conference as any indication of my opinion of the case or 
what your verdict should be. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
It is important that as jurors and officers of this court you obey the following instructions 
at any time you leave the jury box, whether it be for recesses of the court during the day or when 
you leave the courtroom to go home at night. 
First, do not talk about this case either among yourselves or with anyone else during the 
course of the trial. In fairness to all of the parties, you should keep an open mind throughout the 
trial and not form or express an opinion about the case. You should only reach your decision 
after you have heard all the evidence, after you have heard my final instructions and after the 
final arguments. You may discuss this case with the other members of the jury only after it is 
submitted to you for your decision. All such discussion should take place in the jury room. 
Second, do not let any person talk about this case in your presence. If anyone does talk 
about it, tell them you are a juror on the case. If they won't stop talking, report that to the bailiff 
as soon as you are able to do so. You should not tell any of your fellow jurors about what has 
happened. 
Third, during this trial do not talk with any of the parties, their lawyers or any witnesses. 
By this, I mean not only do not talk about the case, but do not talk at all, even to pass the time of 
day. In no other way can all parties be assured of the fairness they are entitled to expect from 
you as Jurors. 
Fourth, during this trial do not make any investigation of this case or inquiry outside of 
the courtroom on your own. Do not go to any place mentioned in the testimony without an 
explicit order from me to do so. You must not consult any books, dictionaries, encyclopedias or 
any other source of information unless I specifically authorize you to do so. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
All contracts have an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This 
covenant requires that the parties perform in good faith the obligations imposed by their 
agreement. A breach of the covenant is therefore a breach of the contract. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 0 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause which, in natural or 
probable sequence, produced the complained injury, loss or damage, and but for that 
cause the damage would not have occurred. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient 
if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a 
proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway. 
INSTRUCTION NO.--=--_ 
Plaintiffs have alleged breach of contract against Defendant High Mark 
Development, LLC. The Court has previously found that the Commercial/Investment 
Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement was a contract between Defendant High Mark 
Development, LLC and Plaintiff O'Shea Family Trust. The Court also previously found 
that the Lease Estoppel Certificate did not contain accurate information, that is, 
representations that the Lease had not been modified, supplemented, altered or amended, 
and representations that all minimum monthly rent had been paid, were not accurate and 
were therefore a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breach 
of contract. 
Therefore, to succeed on their breach of contract claim, Plaintiffs have the burden 
of proving each of the following propositions: 
1. Plaintiffs have been damaged on account of the breach; and 
2. The amount of the damages. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the propositions 
required of the plaintiffs has been proved, your verdict should be for the plaintiffs on the 
breach of contract claim. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that 
each of the propositions required of the plaintiffs has not been proved, your verdict 
should be for the defendant on the breach of contract claim. 
INSTRUCTION NO. '"3 
If the jury decides the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant, the jury 
must determine the amount of money that will reasonable and fairly compensate the 
plaintiff for the following elements of damages proved by the evidence to have resulted 
from the defendant's breach of contract: 
1. Lost profits, or 
2. Loss of value. 
Whether any of these elements of damage has been proved IS for you to 
determine. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ?:>3 
As to the claim of actual fraud, the plaintiffs have the burden of proving each of the 
following propositions by clear and convincing evidence: 
1. That the defendant stated a fact to the plaintiff; 
2. The statement was false; 
3. The statement was material; 
4. The defendant either knew the statement was false or was unaware of whether the 
statement was true at the time the statement was made. 
5. The plaintiff did not know that the statement was false; 
6. The defendant intended for the plaintiff to rely upon the statement and act upon it 
in a manner reasonably contemplated; 
7. The plaintiff did rely upon the truth of the statement; 
8. The plaintiffs reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances; 
9. The plaintiff suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false 
statement. 
10. The nature and extent of the damages to the plaintiff, and the amount thereof. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the elements of fraud have 
been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for the 
plaintiff on this issue. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of 
the foregoing propositions has not been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then 
your verdict should be for the defendant on this issue. 
i 6 1-tj 0 
JUR Y INSTRUCTION NO. _~ 
Silence may constitute fraud when a duty to disclose exists. A party is under a 
duty to disclose if a fact known by one party and not the other is a vital fact upon which 
the bargain is based. To establish fraud by nondisclosure, the party asserting the claim is 
required to prove the following by clear and convincing evidence: 
1. That one party was in possession of a vital fact; 
2. That there was a nondisclosure ofthat fact to the other party; 
3. That the nondisclosure was material; 
4. That the party claiming nondisclosure was unaware of the vital fact not 
disclosed; 
5. That the party failing to disclose knew that the other party did not know that 
fact; 
6. That there was reasonable reliance upon the nondisclosure; 
7. That the party suffered damages proximately caused by the nondisclosure; and 
8. The nature and extent of the damages to that party, and the amount thereof. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the elements of fraud 
by nondisclosure have been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict 
should be for that Plaintiffs on that claim. If you find from your consideration of all the 
evidence that any of the foregoing propositions has not been proved by clear and 
convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for the Defendant on that claim. 
12 La b 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
"Materiality" refers to the importance of the alleged disclosure or nondisclosure in 
determining the party's course of action. A disclosure or nondisclosure is material if (a) a 
reasonable person would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in 
determining a choice of action in the transaction in question, or (b) the person making the 
disclosure or failing to disclose knows or has reason to know that the recipient is likely to 
regard the matter as important in determining the choice of action, whether or not a 
reasonable person would so consider. 
I f -. C" f", 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
Generally, information contained in advertisements and promotional material can 
not be the basis for a claim of misrepresentation. This Court has previously determined 
that the LoopNet ad (exhibit 4) can not be the basis for a claim of fraud. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
It is not a defense to fraud that Plaintiffs could have, by independent 
investigation, ascertained the truth from other sources. 
? 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. _t_J-,,-
Plaintiffs seek to impose liability on High Mark Development, LLC and Gordon 
Arave for the alleged fraud. Plaintiffs also seek to impose liability on High Mark 
Development, LLC, Gordon Arave, and Benjamin Arave for the alleged fraud by 
nondisclosure. Individual managers or officers of a Limited Liability Company may not 
be held liable merely by virtue of their office for fraud committed by the entity or its 
other managers or officers. Instead, to be held liable, a manager or officer must 
specifically direct, actively participate in, or knowingly acquiesce in the fraud or other 
wrongdoing of the company or its managers or officers. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
------'--
If you find in favor of Plaintiffs on one or more claim of fraud, you may award 
damages which are the natural and proximate result of the fraud, which may include lost 
profits or loss of value, which otherwise would not have occurred but for the fraud. 
INSTRUCTION NO. --'-_ 
By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any 
opinion as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages. 
INSTRUCTION NO. --'--''--
A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the 
damage and prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to exercise such 
care cannot be recovered. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. L/ 
I have outlined for you the rules of law applicable to this case and have told you of some 
of the matters which you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few 
minutes counsel will present their closing remarks to you, and then you will retire to the jury 
room for your deliberations. 
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of their deliberations are important. It 
is rarely productive for a juror, at the outset, to make an emphatic expression of his opinion on 
the case or to state how he intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, his sense of 
pride may be aroused; and he may hesitate to change his position, even if shown that it is wrong. 
Remember that you are not pmiisans or advocates, but are judges. For you, as for me, there can 
be no triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views; and deliberate with the objective 
of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of 
you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and 
consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. Lt5 
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, who will 
preside over your deliberations. 
An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. 
Follow the directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of you 
by the instructions on the verdict form. 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As 
soon as nine or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in the 
verdict, you should fill it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary that the 
same nine agree on each question. If your verdict is unanimous, your foreman alone will 
sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing will 
sign the verdict. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will notify the bailiff, 
who will then return you into open court. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. y] 
If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may send 
a note signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate with me 
by any means other than such a note. 
During your deliberation, you are never to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on any of 
the questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so by me. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. L 
In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or 
decide any question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If 
money damages are to be awarded, you may not agree in advance to average the sum of 
each individual juror's estimate as the method of determining the amount of the damage 
award. 
INSTRUCTION NO. "-{ & 
Members of the Jury: In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that at least 
three-fourths of the jury agree. Your verdict must represent the considered judgment 
of each juror agreeing to it. 
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a 
view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual 
judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an 
impmiial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. In the course of 
your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your 
opinion if convinced it is enoneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction as 
to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow 
jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. 
You are not partisans. You are judges - judges of the facts. Your sole 
interest is to ascertain the truth from the evidence in the case. 
Fifth, do not read about the case in the newspapers. Do not listen to radio or television 
broadcasts about the trial. You must base your verdict solely on what is presented in court and 
not upon any newspaper, radio, television or other account of what may have happened. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. cr 
During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you in the jury room my 
instructions concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into 
evidence and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings. 
The instructions are part of the official court record. For this reason please do not alter 
them or mark on them in any way. 
The instructions are numbered for convenience in referring to specific instructions. 
There mayor may not be gaps in the numbering of the instructions. If there are gaps, you should 
not concern yourselves about such gaps. 
INSTRUCTION NO. q 
The following facts are not in dispute: 
Defendant High Mark Development, LLC owned certain commercial property at 1675 
Curlew Drive, Ammon, Idaho. Beginning in approximately June of2007, Defendant advertised 
the property for sale. On August 14,2007, Plaintiffs and the Defendant entered into a Purchase 
and Sale Agreement. The sale closed in December 2007. 
Plaintiffs now seek relief and damages based on allegations of breach of contract, breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, and fraud by nondisclosure. Defendants 
deny Plaintiffs' allegations and deny any liability in this matter. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
Any statement by me identifYing a claim of a party is not evidence in this case. I have 
advised you of the claims of the parties merely to acquaint you with the issues to be decided. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. _11_ 
In general any party who asserts the existence of certain facts has the burden of proving 
that those facts are more probably true than not true. When I say that a party has the burden of 
proof on any proposition by a "preponderance of the evidence," or use the expressions "if you 
find," or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded, considering all the evidence in the case, 
that the proposition on which that party has the burden of proof is more probably true than not 
true. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 12-
When I say a party has the burden of proof on a proposition by clear and convincing 
evidence, I mean you must be persuaded that it is highly probable that such proposition is 
true. This is a higher burden than the general burden that the proposition is more 
probably true than not true. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. t) 
Certain evidence may be presented to you by deposition. A deposition is testimony taken 
under oath before the trial and preserved in writing or upon videotape. This evidence is entitled 
to neither more nor less consideration than you would give the same testimony had the witness 
testified here in the courtroom. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~. \ --
In this case, the Plaintiffs initially included a claim against The Children's Center, 
Inc., The Idaho Children's Center, Inc. and Matthew F. Smith. Plaintiffs are not pursuing 
their claims against these Defendants in this trial. Defendants The Children's Center, Inc. 
and The Idaho Children's Center, Inc. are now defunct, and Defendant Matthew F. Smith 
has been granted a discharge in bankruptcy. You are to disregard all claims or possible 
claims against these Defendants in reaching your decision. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. cL 
The corporations or business entities involved in this case are entitled to the same 
fair and unprejudiced treatment that an individual would be under like circumstances. 
You should decide this case with the same impartiality that you would use in deciding a 
case between individuals. 
INSTRUCTION NO. :::L 
--"--
The term "agent" refers to a person authorized by another, called the "principal," 
to act for or in the place of the principal. The principal is responsible for any act of the 
agent within the agent's scope of authority. Knowledge acquired by an agent during the 
course of the agency relationship is imputed to the principal, and notice to an agent 
constitutes notice to the principal. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 2 
An agency relationship exists where one, called the "principal," has authorized 
another, called the "agent," to act on behalf ofthe principal. 
Agency requires the consent of the principal, which consent may be expressed or 
implied. A business purpose is not required. Compensation of the agent is not required. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. '2, 
The law recognizes agency relationships created by express authority. Agency by 
express authority exists when a person has been actually given authority by the principal 
to act in the principal's name for stated purposes. 
JURY INSTRUCTION No.2 
The law recognizes agency relationships created by implied authority. Agency 
by implied authority exists and applies to those acts by a person that are necessary, usual 
and proper to accomplish or perform within the express authority given by the principal. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 1. 7 
The law recognizes agency relationships created by apparent authority. Agency 
by apparent authority exists when the principal voluntarily places a person in such a 
position that a third person, conversant with the business usages and the nature of a 
particular business, is justified in believing that the agent is authorized to act for the 
principal. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
Conduct is within the scope of the agent's authority ifit occurs while the agent is 
engaged in the duties that the agent was asked or expected to perform and relates to those 
duties. It is not necessary that a particular act or failure to act be expressly authorized by 
the principal to bring it within the scope of the agent's authority. Conduct for the benefit 
of the principal that is incidental to, customarily connected with, or reasonably necessary 
for the performance of such duties is within the scope of the agent's authority. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN~-¥ oFP~dlONj?VnM 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE DONAHUE 
O'SHEA, et a1., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, et al., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV -08-4025 
VERDICT FORM 
We, the jury answer the interrogatories in the Verdict Form as follows: 
Question No. 1. Did High Mark Development LLC's breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing and breach of contract as to the Purchase Agreement and 
estoppel certificate proximately cause damages to Plaintiffs? 
Answer: Yes No ~ 
Question No.2: Did High Mark Development commit fraud, which was a 
proximate cause of damages to Plaintiffs? 
Answer: Yes No / 
Question No.3: Did High Mark Development commit fraud by nondisclosure, 
which was a proximate cause of damages to Plaintiffs? 
Answer: Yes 
If you answered "no" to questions 1 through 3, proceed to question 5. If you answered 
"yes" to any of the questions 1 through 3, proceed to Question No.4. 
13:30 
VERDICT FORM - 1 
Question No.4. What is the total amount of damages sustained by Plaintiffs on 
the foregoing claimCs)? 
Question NO.5: Did Gordon Arave commit fraud, which was a proximate cause 
of damages to Plaintiffs? 
Answer: Yes No -=-
Question No.6: Did Gordon Arave commit fraud by nondisclosure, which was a 
proximate cause of damages to Plaintiffs? 
Answer: Yes No -- ---
If you answered "no" to questions 5 and 6, proceed to question 8. If you answered "yes" 
to questions 5 and/or 6, proceed to Question No.7. 
Question No.7. What is the total amount of damages sustained by Plaintiffs on 
the foregoing claim(s) against Gordon Arave? 
Question No.8: Did Benjamin Arave commit fraud by nondisclosure? 
Answer: Yes --- No ---"--
If you answered "no" to question 8, sign the verdict form and notify the bailiff. If you 
answered "yes" to questions 8, proceed to Question No.9. 
Question NO.9. What is the total amount of damages sustained by Plaintiff on the 
foregoing claim against Benjamin Arave? 




of March, 2010 
Foreman 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE DONAHUE 
O'SHEA, et aI., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT, LLC, et aI., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV -08-4025 
JUDGMENT UPON VERDICT 
Jury trial having commenced on March L 2010, and the jury having returned a verdict on 
March 10, 2010 in favor of Defendants, and good cause appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is 
dismissed with prejudice with Plaintiffs taking nothing thereunder. 
DATED this JU day of March, 2010. 
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JUDGMENT UPON VERDICT - 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this t 0_ day of March, 2010, I did send a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct 
postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox; 
or by causing the same to be hand-delivered. 
Gregory L. Crockett 
Sean J. Coletti 
428 Park Avenue 
P.O. Box 51219 
Idaho FaIls, ID 83405-1219 
Richard]. Armstrong 
WOOD CRAPO, LLC 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
JUDGMENT UPON VERDICT - 2 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bonneville County, Idaho 
By ~. 
Deputy Clerk 
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